Experience, episodic knowledge and judgment in an audit committee member task: experimental evidence by Singtokul, Ong-Ard
 
 
EXPERIENCE, EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT IN AN AUDIT 
 



























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 













Copyright 2010 by Ong-Ard Singtokul 
 
 
EXPERIENCE, EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE AND JUDGMENT IN AN AUDIT 
 






















Dr. Bryan K. Church, Chair    Dr. Arnold Schneider 
College of Management    College of Management 
Georgia Institute of Technology   Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Dr. Xi Kuang      Dr. Ruth Kanfer  
College of Management    School of Psychology 
Georgia Institute of Technology   Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
Dr. Jeffrey Hales 
College of Management 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
 
        
 












Dedicated to My Parents 









Looking back on my journey in the PhD program, I would compare it to a roller-
coaster with numerous ups and downs. On the ride, I have learned much more than I 
would have imagined and met many wonderful individuals who helped me get through 
tough situations. I would like to express my gratitude to those who have been an essential 
part of my achievement. 
First of all, I am genuinely indebted to Dr. Bryan K. Church, my advisor, for his 
generous support, excellent insights, and enduring trust in me. There were times that I 
almost fell from the ride but he always encouraged me to hang on and fight harder. I truly 
believe that being his disciple allowed me to develop into a better person, both personally 
and academically. Next, I would like to thank Dr. Jeffrey Hales who was always willing 
to read my papers and discuss them with me. My research significantly benefits from his 
thorough comments. I also appreciate Dr. Ruth Kanfer who instilled me with broad 
knowledge in psychology and strengthened my interest in the field. I thank Dr. Xi (Jason) 
Kuang and Dr. Arnold Schneider who always welcomed me into their offices and shared 
valuable experiences. My gratitude also extends to Dr. Eugene Comiskey, Dr. Charles 
Mulford and Dr. Deborah Turner, who, along with Dr. Bryan K. Church, inspired me 
during this challenging but invaluable adventure and served as my role models in 
teaching and researching. 
 My journey would not have been complete without my dear companions. I owe a 
special thanks to Lek for assisting me in every way since the first day I arrived in the U.S. 
My sincere appreciation goes to Keng, Lim, Dai, Shanti, Chris, Chih-Hung, Denny, Lin, 
v 
 
and Cheng-Yuan (Vincent) for being there with me in good and bad times. The moments 
we shared together are priceless and are firmly encoded in my episodic memory. Next, I 
would like to thank Wei, Helen, Sarah, Lori, Amy, Justin, Nu, Waew and Aunt for their 
helpful contributions to my research. I am also thankful to my fellow Thai friends at 
Georgia Tech for their beautiful friendship and fine experiences. To name a few, my 
thanks go to Chat, Jing, Gib, Chi, Ter, Ton, and my tennis crews. 
 Lastly, my utmost gratitude goes to my parents who granted me everything I 
could have asked for. Their unconditional love and persistent encouragement were major 
influences on my accomplishments. I also cherish precious support from the rest of my 
family. Now that the long, wild ride has stopped, I realize how fortunate I am to have 
been taught by magnificent professors, surrounded by wonderful peers, and blessed with 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
              Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………... iv 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………….viii 
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………………. ix 
SUMMARY…………………………………………………………………………….. x 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION………………………….………………………….. 1 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW………………….. 9 
2.1 Development of Audit Committees…………………………………………. 9 
2.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise……………………………………….14 
2.3 Documented Effects of Financial Expertise………………………………....18 
CHAPTER 3: EXPERIENCE AND EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE………………… 31 
CHAPTER 4: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT ……………………………….…. 34 
CHAPTER 5: PRELIMINARY STUDY……………………………………………. 41 
5.1 Study Overview…………………………………………………………….. 41 
5.2 Procedures………………………………………………………………….. 42 
5.3 Experimental Predictions.………………………………………………….. 49 
5.4 Results…………………………………………………………………….... 54 
5.5 Discussion………………………………………………………………….. 72 
CHAPTER 6: MAIN STUDY………………………………………………………... 73 
 6.1 Study Overview……………………………………………………………. 73 




              Page 
6.3 Experimental Predictions………………………………………….………... 81 
6.4 Results……………………………………………………………………..... 84 
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION………………………………… 115 
APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (PRELIMINARY 
STUDY)……………………………………….………………….… 118 
APPENDIX B: CALCULATIONS FOR GAME-THEORETIC 
EQUILIBRIUMS OF THE AUDITOR-MANAGER TASK…..... 131 
APPENDIX C: TEN-PAIRED LOTTERY-CHOICE DECISIONS……………… 135 
APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (MAIN STUDY)………… 137 





LIST OF TABLES 
              Page 
Table 1: Probability of Acceptable Error in Auditor-Manager Task.....………………... 52 
 
Table 2: Summary of Task I Results (Preliminary Study)…………………………….. . 56 
 
Table 3: Task II Descriptive Statistics (Preliminary Study)……………….…………… 59 
 
Table 4: Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II (Preliminary Study)…….... 61 
 
Table 5: Relationships between Decisions in Task I and Task II (Preliminary Study)… 63 
 
Table 6: Summary of Task I Results after Median Split (Preliminary Study)………….. 66 
 
Table 7: Task II Descriptive Statistics after Median Split (Preliminary Study)……….   68 
 
Table 8: Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II after Median Split 
(Preliminary Study)………………………………………….……….……….. 70 
 
Table 9: Conceptual Knowledge and Risk Preference Scores (Main Study)…….……... 85 
 
Table 10: Summary of Task I Results (Main Study)………………………………….... 87 
 
Table 11: Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II (Main Study)…………… 91 
 
Table 12: Summary of Task I Results after Overall-Median and Group-Median 
Splits (Main Study)………………………………………………..………… 95 
 
Table 13: Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II after Overall-Median 
Split (Main Study)………………………………………………..…….……. 97 
 
Table 14: Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II after Group-Median 
Split (Main Study)………………………………………………..………..… 99 
 
Table 15: Robustness Check - Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II 
(Main Study)……………………………………………………………….. 104 
 
Table 16: Robustness Check - Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II 
after Overall-Median Split (Main Study)…………….…………………….. 106 
 
Table 17: Robustness Check - Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II 
after Group-Median Split (Main Study)…………………………………… 108 
 




LIST OF FIGURES 
              Page 
Figure 1: Summary of Hypothesized Relationships…………………..……………….... 40 
 
Figure 2: Procedure in Auditor-Manager Task…………..………………….………….. 44 
 
Figure 3: Payoffs in Auditor-Manager Task (Preliminary Study)…………..….………. 46 
 
Figure 4: Extensive Game Form Representation of Auditor-Manager Task…………… 50 
 
Figure 5: Frequency Distribution of Auditor’s Acceptance of Manager’s 
Reports (Preliminary Study)…………………………………...…….……….. 57 
 
Figure 6: Payoffs in Auditor-Manager Task (Main Study)…………..…………………. 78 
 
Figure 7: Frequency Distribution of Auditor’s Acceptance of Manager’s 






 I conduct experiments to investigate how episodic knowledge obtained from prior 
experience as an auditor or a manager affects audit committee members’ judgment in 
supporting the auditor in a disagreement with management. This paper sheds light on the 
advantage of first-hand accounting-related experience in the important oversight task. It 
also brings to bear the potential benefit from direct manager experience as claimed by 
researchers and regulators. I find that the episodic knowledge obtained from prior 
experience as an auditor, especially the experience of having been a diligent auditor, 
strengthens the degree of auditor support of participants in the role of an audit committee 
member. By contrast, the effect of episodic knowledge from first-hand experience as a 
manager on the likelihood of auditor support varies with the manager type. While the 
episodic knowledge acquired from direct experience as an aggressive manager augments 
the level of auditor support, such knowledge attained by prior experience as a 







Effective audit committees protect shareholders’ interest by playing an oversight 
role to ensure reliable financial reporting, internal controls, and risk management 
(DeZoort et al. 2002).  The Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999) suggests that audit 
committee members have candid discussions with auditors and management regarding 
issues implicating judgment and impacting the quality of financial reports. Moreover, 
SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications, requires that the auditor communicate 
with the audit committee on various issues including disagreements with management. 
Given the grey area in professional standards, such as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP), reconciling auditor-management disagreements becomes an 
important audit committee task.1 This paper attempts to shed light on whether and how 
episodic knowledge gained via direct experience in the role of an auditor or a manager 
affects audit committee members’ conflict resolution judgments. 
Researchers in various disciplines use different distinctions to describe 
knowledge, but one of the most useful distinctions in the audit-judgment literature is 
based on research on long-term memory (Libby 1995). Previous studies (e.g., Anderson 
2000 and McDaniel et al. 2002) suggest that the variations in judgment and decision 
making between experts and novices result from knowledge differences that relate to 
episodic and semantic memory. Episodic memory stores particular experiences (episodic 
knowledge), while semantic memory stores knowledge about facts, concepts, meanings, 
                                                 
1 Extant experimental studies on the audit committee’s role focus on audit committee performance 
reconciling auditor-manager disagreements (e.g., Knapp 1987; DeZoort and Salterio 2001; DeZoort et al. 
2003; DeZoort et al. 2008). 
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and relations (semantic knowledge). In general, people acquire both kinds of knowledge 
through first- and second-hand encounters. The former refers to direct experience with 
relevant problems, whereas the latter includes education, training, reading books, and 
discussion with others. 
Investigating whether and how episodic knowledge obtained from first-hand 
experience as an auditor or a manager affects audit committee members’ judgment in 
reconciling disagreements is critical for several reasons. First, my paper has implications 
for the definition of financial expertise, which was considered one of the most 
controversial features of the proposed Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) rules (SEC 2003). The 
SEC initially proposed a definition of financial expertise that commanded prior 
accounting-related work experience.2 The requirement of accounting-specific experience, 
however, led to intense criticism that the definition was too restrictive and excessively 
limited the pool of qualified directors (e.g., Olson 1999 and Kirk 2000). As a 
compromise, the SEC adopted a broader definition of financial expertise which shifted 
the focus from accounting-related experience to an understanding of GAAP, financial 
statements, and internal control over financial reporting. This change allows directors 
who only possess accounting-related semantic but not episodic knowledge to serve as a 
financial expert. However, the question of whether accounting-specific experience, which 
is a critical source of episodic knowledge, should be a requirement for financial experts 
has been left open. 
Researchers typically categorize financial experts into accounting and non-
accounting financial experts based on whether they have accounting-related work 
experience. The major difference between the two groups lies in the level of first-hand 
                                                 
2 Accounting-related experience refers to either public or corporate accounting experience. 
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accounting experience. Accounting financial experts can acquire knowledge through 
direct work experience as well as through second-hand encounters, while the learning 
opportunity of non-accounting financial experts is limited to second-hand experience 
only. Although the difference in first-hand accounting experience may lead to both 
episodic and semantic knowledge differences, I expect a larger gap in episodic than 
semantic knowledge between accounting and non-accounting financial experts. After all, 
a large portion of semantic knowledge can be acquired through education and other 
second-hand encounters. Episodic knowledge, on the other hand, is mainly obtained from 
first-hand experiences, which are generally much richer than second-hand encounters 
(Ryan et al. 2008). If episodic knowledge obtained from direct experience in the 
accounting-related role enhances audit committee members’ judgment, first-hand 
accounting experience could be considered a valuable attribute of financial expertise. 
Second, my paper extends the stream of research examining the importance of 
accounting-related experience in audit committee tasks. Extant literature indicates that 
the presence of an expert with accounting experience leads to lower levels of accrual 
earnings management (Bedard et al. 2004, Carcello et al. 2006, and Dhaliwal et al. 2006), 
earnings restatement (Abbott et al. 2004), and fraud (Farber 2005). Moreover, accounting 
financial expertise improves monitoring mechanisms by enhancing accounting 
conservatism (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008) and internal control quality (Krishnan 
2005). On the other hand, a number of studies fail to find evidence of an association 
between audit committee effectiveness and non-accounting financial expertise (e.g., 
Davidson et al. 2004, DeFond et al. 2005, Dhaliwal et al. 2006, and Krishnan and 
Visvanathan 2008). While these findings underscore the importance of accounting 
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experience to the audit committee’s role, the effects of episodic and semantic knowledge 
are entangled in the studies. After all, accounting financial experts may have greater 
semantic as well as episodic knowledge (from their educational background and work 
experience in accounting) than the non-accounting counterparts. This paper is the first to 
examine the potential effect of episodic knowledge on audit committee effectiveness, 
after controlling for semantic knowledge. 
Third, my paper is the first to provide behavioral evidence that prior experience in 
the manager role can augment audit committee members’ judgment. Several practitioners 
and researchers have questioned the need of financial expertise for an effective audit 
committee. For instance, AIMR (1999) and Olson (1999) argue that practical 
management experience could be more important than financial expertise. Nevertheless, 
management experience has not received due attention in research on audit committees 
thus far. 
Extant research indicates different incentives among managers and auditors. 
Managers’ may have an incentive to report aggressively or conservatively (e.g., see 
Cuccia et al. 1995). Apparently, a large amount of research (e.g., Brown 2001 and Bartov 
et al. 2002) documents management’s propensity to avoid negative earnings surprises and 
to reach certain earnings targets by managing earnings. Despite the importance of their 
role in mitigating aggressive reporting, auditors generally face an imbalance of power, 
relative to management, in the audit context. For example, overzealous clients may 
demand auditors to act in management’s economic interests (Knapp 1987). If the auditor 
refuses to cater to management’s interests, they may lose the client. Hackenbrack and 
Nelson (1996) discuss the conflicting incentives of the auditor. On one hand, the auditor 
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may encounter financial and reputation loss if permitting overly-aggressive reporting. On 
the other hand, auditors’ need to retain the client may lead them to accept an overly-
aggressive report.3 Hence, I distinguish episodic knowledge of a diligent auditor from 
that of a lax auditor and episodic knowledge of an aggressive manager from that of a 
conservative manager. 
Knapp (1987) indicates that some audit failures occur because audit committee 
members lack adequate sensitivity to management’s pressure on the auditor. This may 
result from deficiency of necessary knowledge for their oversight role. For instance, 
Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) find that companies that made suspicious auditor 
switches had fewer audit committee members with experience in accounting, auditing, or 
finance. Therefore, consistent with prior research (e.g., DeZoort and Salterio 2001, 
DeZoort et al. 2003 and 2008), my study uses a level of auditor support in auditor-
manager disagreements as a proxy for audit committee effectiveness. 
My particular interest is in bringing to bear the impact of episodic knowledge 
obtained from prior experience as an auditor or a manager on a level of auditor support 
during auditor-manager disagreements. I do not focus on technical knowledge in financial 
reporting, which is an example of semantic knowledge generally attained by second-hand 
experience (e.g., how to account for a transaction). Instead, I concentrate on the strategic 
interplay between an auditor and a manager in financial reporting, which requires the 
anticipation of the other party’s actions. Certain kinds of experience may provide relevant 
episodic knowledge that promotes understanding of the strategic tensions between the 
                                                 
3 To mitigate management’s influence on the auditor, SOX Section 301(2) mandates that the auditor report 
directly to the audit committee. The rule shifts the authority to appoint, evaluate, and select the auditor 
from management to the independent audit committee. Thus, the auditor’s objectivity in constraining 
overly aggressive behavior should increase post-SOX. 
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auditor and the manager. Hence, the retrieval of such episodic knowledge may affect a 
degree of auditor support of an audit committee member. 
I conducted an experiment, which entails two tasks, to examine the impact of 
episodic knowledge of an auditor or a manager on audit committee members’ propensity 
to support the auditor. The experiment employs a 2 × 2 + 1 between-participants design 
that varies (1) whether participants in the role of an audit committee member have prior 
experience as an auditor or a manager and (2) the payoff for detected aggressive reporting 
behavior in the participants’ prior experience, plus a control group (no experience). In the 
first task, undergraduate and graduate students (excluding those in the control group) 
took the role of auditor or manager to obtain relevant episodic knowledge. In the second 
task, all participants took the role of an audit committee member reconciling auditor-
manager conflicts. Using an experiment allows me to manipulate the level of episodic 
knowledge, while controlling for the level of semantic knowledge. This would be 
extremely difficult to accomplish outside the laboratory. 
To examine how varying episodic knowledge obtained from different experience 
affects participants’ auditor support in the audit committee task, I divide participants into 
five groups: (1) an aggressive manager, (2) a conservative manager, (3) a diligent auditor, 
(4) a lax auditor, and (5) a control group (no direct experience). I first employ a 
classification by their incentives, followed by a classification by their actions. My 
experimental results indicate that episodic knowledge from direct experience as an 
auditor, especially the experience as a diligent auditor, leads to a greater level of auditor 
support. Furthermore, when the classification by the actions is used, episodic knowledge 
of a diligent auditor results in greater auditor support than that of a lax auditor. While 
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episodic knowledge gained from experience as an aggressive manager enhances auditor 
support, the knowledge from the conservative manager’s experience does not. Therefore, 
my study shows that the presence of an audit committee member with direct experience 
as an auditor or an aggressive manager can enhance audit committee judgment. 
Lastly, this study contributes to accounting practice and literature by shedding 
light on the linkage between episodic knowledge acquired from experience in the role of 
an auditor or a manager and audit committee performance. This analysis is important 
because while most financial experts have prior work experience in a management 
position, only accounting financial experts have accounting work experience. The current 
definition of a financial expert encompasses non-accounting financial experts such as 
CEOs and Presidents. These non-accounting experts may possess episodic knowledge 
gained from direct experience as a manager but not episodic knowledge obtained in the 
auditor experience. 
My results suggest the potential benefit of appointing an accounting financial 
expert, especially those with experience as a diligent auditor. Hence, the original 
definition of audit committee financial expertise is not without a merit. However, whether 
the regulator should revert back to the original definition also depends on additional cost 
that comes with the stricter definition. My results also indicate that appointing a non-
accounting financial expert can be fruitful if he/she has experience of having been an 
aggressive manager. However, keep in mind that my study only concentrates on episodic 
knowledge pertaining to the nature of auditing, but not other kinds of technical (semantic) 
knowledge regarding accounting or management. 
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 This study contributes to audit judgment research pertaining to the transfer of 
knowledge acquired from direct experience as an auditor to other roles. For instance, 
Bowlin et al. (2009) find that prior experience as an auditor, especially the experience of 
having been a diligent auditor, lower managers’ aggressive reporting behavior when 
penalties for detected aggressive reporting are large. My paper indicates that direct 
experience as an auditor also enhances judgment in the audit committee task. Moreover, 
it extends a stream of research on the impact of accounting knowledge and experience on 
auditor support in the audit committee task. In particular, it provides evidence supporting 
the merit of episodic knowledge attained by direct experience as an auditor, in addition to 
the conventional accounting and auditing textbook knowledge. It also calls more attention 
to direct management experience in accounting research. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses audit 
committee financial expertise and reviews prior literature. Chapter 3 provides 
background knowledge on experience and episodic knowledge. Chapter 4 develops 
hypotheses. The preliminary study is introduced in Chapter 5, followed by the main study 




BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides background information on audit committee financial 
expertise and related literature. It is organized as follows: Chapter 2.1 traces the history 
of audit committees and entails their roles and responsibilities. Chapter 2.2 discusses the 
requirement of financial expertise, especially the issues involving its definition.  Lastly, 
Chapter 2.3 synthesizes the extant literature on audit committee financial expertise. 
 
2.1 Development of Audit Committees 
2.1.1 Historical Perspective 
The development of audit committees can be traced back as early as 1940, when 
the SEC endorsed the audit committee concept as a potent function in ensuring the 
accuracy of traded companies’ financial reporting. The original audit committee concept 
suggests that the board of directors in general and the audit committee in particular are 
responsible for setting a control environment to discipline unusual business practices, 
aggressive accounting methods, and violations of the company’s code of business 
conduct. Given such a role and responsibilities, audit committees should be composed of 
outside directors, who are independent on the firm. In 1972, the SEC encouraged all 
publicly held companies to establish audit committees composed of outside directors and 




 In 1977, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) required boards of directors of 
listed companies to appoint an audit committee composed of outside directors; the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASDAQ) and American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) subsequently adopted the requirement in the 1980s. Nevertheless, early audit 
committees did not prove to be adequate watchdogs against fraud. Even in the late 1980s, 
most audit committee charters, listing the audit committee’s job description, were only 
two paragraphs long and did not include substantive responsibilities. To emphasize the 
importance of the audit committee, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 
issued the Treadway Report in 1987. The Treadway Report was the first formal 
documentation setting standards for audit committee responsibilities based on best 
practices rather than common practices. Significant oversight tasks, including 
responsibilities to prevent fraudulent financial reporting, were assigned to the audit 
committee. The report also suggested minimum frequencies for important tasks of the 
audit committee: e.g., reviewing financial statements (quarterly) and reviewing 
management compliance with the corporate code of conduct (annually). 
In 1988, due to the increased oversight responsibility, the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued SAS No. 61, Communication with Audit 
Committees, addressing communications between the external auditor, the audit 
committee, and management of a company. Specifically, management has to keep the 
audit committee informed of both routine and sensitive information and the external 
auditor should raise critical concerns regarding financial reporting with the audit 
committee. In 1992, COSO issued Internal Control-Integrated Framework to develop a 
common definition of internal control and to provide guidance for evaluating internal 
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control effectiveness. In 1993, the Public Oversight Board (POB) issued the first POB 
report, In the Public Interest-A Special Report. The report described the independent 
audit as a “public watchdog” function and encouraged independent accountants to help 
audit committees understand their responsibilities. In addition, audit committees should 
request management letters, including recommendations to help improve the internal 
controls of the corporations, from the external auditor. The second POB report issued in 
1995, Directors, Management, and Auditors-Allies in Protecting Shareholder Interests, 
further accentuated the importance of informed discussions between the audit committee 
and the external auditor. 
 Despite a number of initiatives, it became clear in the late 1990’s that audit 
committees did not provide a sufficient guard against fraudulent financial reporting, 
earnings management, and creative accounting practices. In 1998, the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (BRC) was established to study how audit committees could be more 
effective. The BRC recognized that the audit committee plays a vital role in ensuring 
high-quality financial reporting and recommended that companies establish independent 
audit committees with a minimum of three financially literate members and one financial 
expert. The SEC and other self-regulating organizations adopted the requirement for 
independent audit committee members in 1999. However, the requirement of the 
financial expert was adopted only by the major U.S. stock exchanges. 
 In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) as a response to 
heightened awareness of management financial fraud, especially from the downfalls of 
Enron Corp. in 2001 and WorldCom Inc. in 2002. As a result, the independence of audit 
committee members became a requirement by statue. The audit committee financial 
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expert requirements were finalized and issued in 2003, requiring public disclosure of 
whether public companies have a financial expert on the audit committee of their board 
of directors, with the expectation that financial expertise on the audit committee will 
strengthen corporate governance and protect shareholders. Moreover, recent changes in 
listing standards of the major U.S. stock exchanges require not only that audit committees 
be composed of at least three independent, financially literate directors but also require at 
least one member who possesses financial expertise on the committee. Until now, SOX 
has been the major regulation that drives the composition, roles, and responsibilities of 
audit committees in the U.S. 
 
2.1.2 Audit Committee Roles and Responsibilities 
The role and responsibilities of audit committees have developed over time, from 
an originally loose concept to obligations and fiduciary duties by statue. Since the 
passage of SOX, the role of audit committees has been to guard against management 
fraud by monitoring the financial reporting function and internal controls of an 
organization. The fundamental responsibilities of an audit committee include monitoring 
the financial reporting process to ensure timely and accurate reporting, minimizing 
problems arising from conflict-of-interest, and cooperating with the external auditor, the 
internal auditor and management. 
 According to the BRC, audit committees are not to prepare financial statements 
but rather are responsible for monitoring and overseeing the financial reporting process. 
They must ensure that proper internal controls are established, understand the company’s 
risk assessment and be informed of critical accounting choices and decisions. Audit 
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committee members should meet regularly and as needed with external auditors, the 
company’s management, internal auditors and other personnel responsible for the 
company’s financial reporting process and internal controls. Information regarding 
discussions on financial statements and related judgments must also be included in a 
company’s proxy statement. 
Under SOX (Section 301), audit committees are responsible for the appointment, 
compensation, and monitoring of the outside auditors. They have to be aware of possible 
conflicts-of-interest and other provisions imposed by SOX, especially that a lack of 
independence of the accounting firm should prohibit the firm from being appointed. For 
instance, an accounting firm cannot provide service if one of the company’s senior 
management was employed by that accounting firm in the prior year. In addition, the 
PCAOB identifies certain non-audit services that would preclude an audit committee 
from approving an audit firm: e.g., bookkeeping, financial information systems design 
and implementation, and internal audit services. This governance structure protects 
financial reporting integrity by isolating the external auditor from possible management 
pressure. 
  An audit committee is not a stand-alone functioning group. Audit committee 
members must communicate with management and employees as well as internal and 
external auditors. The audit committee must disclose all information pertaining to the 
financial reporting process to the external auditor. Working together, audit committee 
members and the external auditor determine if the adopted accounting principles and 
choices are consistent with industry standards or in compliance with GAAP. Moreover, 
SOX requires audit committee members and management to meet regularly to discuss the 
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treatment of complex transactions and any significant internal control deficiencies. Audit 
committee members also play a major role in reconciling disputes between the external 
auditor and management regarding accounting treatments. 
 In sum, an audit committee is expected to perform several duties leading to 
financial reporting integrity; their main tasks involve accounting and audit matters, 
internal control, and auditor independence. The oversight of the financial reporting 
process can be considered the audit committee’s most important responsibility. Most 
audit committee members aim to spend more time on accounting judgments and 
estimates, and identify it as their top priority, followed by the oversight of risk 
management (KPMG 2006). In addition, audit committee members interact and receive 
support from management, auditors, and other employees. Audit committees request 
input such as pre-meeting materials, have discussions with others, raise notable concerns 
and disclose relevant information in the meetings. 
 
2.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
The U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and major stock 
exchanges adopted a recommendation from the BRC that all audit committee members be 
financially literate and at least one member demonstrate a higher level of financial 
reporting knowledge, referred to as financial expertise (BRC 1999). Hence, financial 
experts must possess financial literacy, described as the ability to read and understand 
fundamental financial statements, plus extra knowledge pertaining to financial reporting 
and financial statements that will improve the audit committee’s effectiveness.  
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The controversial definition of financial expertise had been intensely disputed 
before the SEC stipulated the final rules. According to the originally proposed SEC rule 
(November 2002), a financial expert is an audit committee member who, through 
education and experience, possesses the following attributes: (1) an understanding of 
GAAP and financial statements, (2) experience applying GAAP principles in connection 
with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves, (3) experience preparing or 
auditing financial statements generally comparable to the company’s, (4) experience with 
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting, and (5) an understanding of audit 
committee functions. This definition of financial expertise commands prior accounting-
related experience of a financial expert, such experience as a public accountant, auditor, 
principal financial/accounting officer, or controller. Since the best practices suggest that 
audit committees are responsible for duties that may require a high degree of accounting 
sophistication, this accounting-specific definition of financial expertise may very well be 
justified at first glance. 
However, narrowly defining financial expertise as accounting-specific expertise 
became one of the most controversial features of the newly proposed SOX rules (SEC 
2003). The chief arguments against this definition were that the focus on the accounting-
specific expertise (experience) was too restrictive and terribly limited the pool of 
qualified directors. Due to intense criticism, the SEC compromised by adopting a broader 
definition of financial expertise (March 2003). The final rule defines a financial expert as 
an audit committee member who possesses the following attributes: (1) an understanding 
of GAAP and financial statements, (2) an ability to assess the general application of 
GAAP in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves, (3) 
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experience preparing, auditing, analyzing or evaluating financial statements generally 
comparable to the company’s, (4) an understanding of internal controls and procedures 
for financial reporting, and (5) an understanding of audit committee functions. 
As opposed to the original definition, the new definition concentrates more on 
knowledge (understanding) rather than first-hand experience. The rule also specifies that, 
in addition to direct accounting experience, a member may gain financial expertise 
through experience supervising employees with financial reporting responsibilities, 
overseeing the performance of companies, and other relevant experience. Clearly, this 
new definition has widened the pool of qualified members with the intent to subdue the 
negative reaction to the more restrictive original definition. 
 The crucial question pertaining to the definition of an audit committee financial 
expert is whether the SEC compromised too much for quantity in lieu of quality. Despite 
the definition suggested by the final version of SOX being enforced, critics of the 
definition argue that the new definition may be too broad. For instance, this definition 
extends the qualified experts to encompass company presidents and CEOs because by 
virtue of their positions, they are supervisors of financial and accounting officers, and 
overseers of company performance. Even the SEC is reluctant to explicitly state that 
presidents and CEOs qualify as financial experts and thus defer the determination of a 
financial expert to the board of the appointing company (SEC 2003). Therefore, research 
on whether financial experts qualified by the arguably loose definition leads to the 
improvement of audit committee performance, and whether the level of improvement is 
comparable to that generated from financial experts qualified based on the original 
definition, will shed light on the justification of the currently adopted definition. 
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 The SEC’s final rule also requires a company to disclose whether it has appointed 
at least one audit committee financial expert in its annual report. If so, the company must 
disclose the expert’s name and whether the expert is independent. If no expert is 
appointed, the company must explain why not. Thus, researchers have searched through 
companies’ proxy statement for information on whether a company has an audit 
committee financial expert based on the final rule’s definition. Many researchers have 
gone further by reading through a financial expert’s biography in the proxy statement to 
determine whether the expert would be classified as such had the original definition of an 
audit committee financial expert been adopted. Most likely, financial experts with prior 
work experience in accounting and auditing such as principle accounting officers, 
controllers, public accountants, and auditors would be qualified regardless of which 
definition is used and thus are labeled “accounting financial experts.” In contrast, experts 
who do not fit in the original definition are generally called “non-accounting financial 
experts.” 
Over the past decade, a number of researchers have conducted empirical research 
to study the impact of financial expertise. Most researchers code financial expertise 
variables as dummy variables (0 or 1) based on whether a company has at least one 
financial expert, potentially because companies are not required to disclose the names of 
any additional audit committee financial experts beyond the first one. The dummy coding 
treatment may have been appropriate in the past since most companies had only one audit 
committee financial expert. However, this treatment implies the indifference between 
having one financial expert and several experts on the audit committee. With the growing 
complexity of financial reporting issues and associated risks, audit committees of large 
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companies tend to have more than one audit committee financial expert (KPMG 2006). 
This provides a good opportunity to measure the incremental value of having multiple 
financial experts on the same audit committee by coding financial expertise based on the 
number of financial experts. 
 
2.3 Documented Effects of Financial Expertise 
Despite the potential benefits to the firm portrayed in the previous section, the 
requirement of financial expertise does not come without cost. The major hurdles include 
the difficulty of finding qualified audit committee members and that qualified individuals 
may be hesitant to serve on the audit committee due to the increased legal exposure for 
designated experts (Zacharias 2000). Firms may also have to pay higher compensation to 
attract qualified individuals. Hence, empirical evidence documenting the benefits of 
financial expertise to the firm is necessary to justify financial expertise. 
Because audit committees are responsible for scrutiny of financial reports, 
financial expertise is expected to improve audit committee effectiveness (e.g., POB 1993 
and 1994). In addition, matters reported to audit committees are usually of a technical 
nature and thus require sufficient accounting and auditing knowledge for effective 
oversight (Bull and Sharp 1989).  An inclusion of a financial expert should increase the 
amount of financial reporting oversight provided by the audit committee. The greater 
monitoring of the financial reporting process should lead to improvements in the 
corporate governance process, and ultimately higher quality financial reports. Audit 
committee effectiveness has been measured using various proxies pertaining to external 
financial reporting as well as internal control systems. 
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2.3.1 Degree of Auditor Support 
 DeZoort and Salterio (2001) use short knowledge tests to measure financial-
reporting knowledge4 and audit-reporting knowledge5 of audit committee members. They 
find that higher corporate governance experience6 and audit-reporting knowledge are 
associated with greater support for the auditor in the dispute with client management. On 
the other hand, they find no relationship between financial-reporting knowledge and audit 
committee member judgment. Although the paper focuses on different types of 
knowledge as components of financial literacy instead of financial expertise per se, the 
results shed some light on the importance of the definition and measurement of financial 
expertise, consistent with the concern of the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD 2002). 
DeZoort et al. (2003) examine audit committee member support for proposed 
audit adjustments. Using audit committee members with various backgrounds, they 
document greater support when management’s incentives to manipulate financial reports 
are high (e.g., near the fiscal year end) and when the auditor consistently argues for 
adjustment. Interestingly, they also find a counterintuitive result that audit committee 
members with experience in public accounting are less likely to recommend adjustment. 
Based on written explanations, audit committee members with CPA experience seems to 
view the proposed judgment in their experiment as immaterial. 
They rerun the experiment in 2008 to shed light on the impact of SOX on audit 
committee member support to the auditor (DeZoort et al. 2008). Compared to 2003 (pre-
                                                 
4 Financial-reporting knowledge refers to an understanding of how business activities are presented in the 
financial statements and the ability to analyze these statements. 
5 Audit-reporting knowledge refers to an understanding of the nature and the purposes of the financial 
statement audit. 
6 Corporate governance experience refers to experience as independent directors. 
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SOX), audit committee member support for an auditor-adjustment in 2008 (post-SOX) is 
significantly higher. Furthermore, they find that the increase in support is attributable to 
audit committee members with CPA experience. The results suggest that audit committee 
members, especially those with public accounting experience, feel more responsible for 
resolving the accounting issue and are more conservative in the post-SOX period. 
 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance and Internal Controls 
Some researchers use the quality of corporate governance and internal controls as 
a benchmark for audit committee effectiveness. Financial expertise is expected to 
strengthen corporate governance by enhancing the board’s ability to protect shareholder 
interests, thereby increasing shareholder value. Recent regulations, including SOX 
requirements, have emphasized good internal control as an important tool for achieving 
high-quality financial reporting. The quality of an entity’s internal control is a function of 
the quality of its internal control environment and other non-governance-related controls, 
so there should be a positive association between audit committee quality and internal 
control quality. 
DeZoort (1998) finds that audit committee members who had internal control 
oversight experience made internal control judgments more like auditors than did 
members without such experience. Abbott et al. (2004) find that firms with financial 
experts on audit committees are less likely to restate earnings or commit fraud. Farber 
(2005) finds that firms that committed frauds have fewer financial experts on the audit 
committee, relative to non-fraud firms.  Krishnan (2005) compares audit committee 
characteristics of companies (1) disclosing internal control problems pointed out by the 
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predecessor auditors and (2) companies changing auditors but not disclosing internal 
control problems. She finds that the existence of internal control problems is associated 
with the number of audit committee members with financial expertise and the 
relationship persists at both severity levels of the internal control problems: reportable 
conditions and material weaknesses. Notwithstanding the limited samples, the results 
shed some light as to the possibility that financial expertise enhances the audit committee 
quality, which in turn augments internal control quality. 
Extending this line of research, Wallace et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) 
examine stock market reaction to the appointment of new directors with financial 
expertise. An appointment of a financial expert should result in higher protection of 
shareholders so a positive market reaction is expected when the appointment is publicly 
announced. Wallace et al. (2004) report a significant positive stock price reaction to an 
appointment of new members of audit committees who have financial expertise. They 
conduct further analysis of financial expertise breaking it down into three types of 
experience: (1) auditing and audit firm experience,7 (2) corporate financial management 
experience,8 and (3) financial statement analysis experience.9 The results show that 
shareholders may perceive auditing and audit firm experience as more important relative 
to corporate financial management and financial statement analysis experience. 
                                                 
7 A director has auditing and audit firm experience if the director was employed by a CPA firm or worked 
as an audit consultant. 
8 A director has corporate financial management experience if the director was a principal manager with 
financial oversight responsibility, including chief executive officer, chief financial officer, vice president of 
finance, corporate controller, or chief accounting officer. 
9 A director has financial statement analysis experience if the director was an executive in the investment, 
investment banking, or commercial banking industry, or worked as financial consultant or college professor 






DeFond et al. (2005) disaggregate financial experts into (1) accounting financial 
experts, which are narrowly defined as in the original SEC proposal, and (2) 
nonaccounting financial experts, which are broadly defined based on the definition from 
the final version of the SEC rule (including presidents and CEOs). They find significant 
and positive average three-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the 
announcement of the appointment of accounting financial experts to audit committees. 
However, the comparable returns for firms appointing non-accounting financial experts 
and non-experts are not significant. Therefore, it is tenable that the specialized skills 
possessed by accounting financial experts make the directors more effective in 
overseeing the financial reporting process and ensuring high-quality financial reporting. 
Ultimately, the appointment of an accounting financial expert leads to an increase in 
stock price due to improved corporate governance as well as a decrease in information 
risk. The finding implies that only accounting financial expertise enhances corporate 
governance and supports the narrower definition of financial expertise. Nevertheless, 
keep in mind that stock reaction observed in the study reflects perception toward 
financial reporting quality, but not necessarily the actual quality. 
 
2.3.3 Earnings Quality 
A great deal of research on financial expertise uses quality of reported earnings as 
a measure of audit committee effectiveness. Firms may manage earnings in order to 
mislead stakeholders about their underlying economic performance (Healy and Wahlen 
1999). Effective audit committees are less likely to permit aggressive earnings 
management (BRC 1999). Bedard et al. (2004) examine the association between SOX 
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requirements, including financial expertise, and abnormal accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management activity. They find that the presence of at least one audit committee 
member with financial expertise is associated with a lower likelihood of aggressive 
earnings management. Furthermore, Antle and Nalebuff (1991) suggest that auditors 
exhibit an asymmetric loss function and thus are more likely to require adjustments to 
positive than negative accruals. Income decreasing accruals are often regarded as 
indicative of conservative reporting behavior. Hence, earnings management is further 
broken down into two categories: income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings 
management and the associations with expertise are studied separately. Bedard et al. 
(2004) find that unlike auditors, financial experts do not exhibit an asymmetric loss 
function and are concerned with both income-increasing as well as income-decreasing 
earnings management.  
Carcello et al. (2006) extend this area of research by discerning among the 
different definitions of financial expertise and the interactions between having an audit 
committee financial expert and other corporate governance mechanisms. In contrast to 
Bedard et al. (2004), they study various types of financial experts separately: (1) 
accounting financial experts, (2) non-accounting experts who are senior business 
executives, and (3) other non-accounting financial experts. They also investigate the 
impact of financial expertise on real earnings management, in addition to accrual 
earnings management. Their findings indicate a significant relation between having a 
financial expert and a lower level of earnings management, but only in cases of 
accounting and other non-accounting financial experts. In addition, there is a positive 
association between financial expertise and real earnings management. The results 
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suggest that accounting financial experts may be effective in constraining accounting 
accruals earnings management so management engages in real activities management 
instead. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) decompose the broad definition of financial expertise into 
accounting, finance, and supervisory expertise10 and test whether each type of financial 
expertise is associated with accruals quality, a proxy for earnings management. They 
presume that the higher the earnings management activities, the lower the financial 
reporting quality. Similar to Carcello et al. (2006), they only find a significant positive 
association between accounting expertise and accruals quality but fail to find a significant 
relation between other types of expertise and accruals quality. These results suggest that 




 A considerable amount of research focuses on accounting conservatism as a 
means to gauge audit committee effectiveness. Conservatism is a component of 
transparency, which is generally considered as a desirable attribute of high-quality 
financial reporting (Francis et al. 2004).  
Although DeFond et al. (2005) find a positive market reaction to the appointment 
of an accounting financial expert, the market reaction is only an expectation of value 
enhancement, not reflecting actual improvements resulting from the appointment (Engel 
2005). Krishnan and Visvanathan (2005) examine a possible explanation for DeFond et 
                                                 
10 Supervisory expertise refers to expertise entailed in supervising the preparation of financial statements. 
Hence, a CEO or company president is deemed to have supervisory expertise. 
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al.’s (2005) finding by inspecting the association between financial expertise and 
accounting conservatism. Similar to DeFond et al. (2005), they measure audit committee 
expertise in three ways: (1) accounting financial experts, (2) non-accounting financial 
experts, and (3) non-financial experts. They find that conservatism is positively 
associated with accounting financial expertise, but not correlated with the other measures 
of expertise. Because of their accounting expertise and incentives to protect their 
reputation capital, audit committee members with accounting expertise may enhance 
conservatism by encouraging more effective monitoring. This notion provides an 
important link in understanding why the stock market reacts favorably to the appointing 
of accounting financial experts. Overall, the findings suggest that adopting a narrower 
definition of a financial expert is likely to improve the audit committee effectiveness. 
 
2.3.5 No Significant Effect 
 Despite a great deal of evidence that documents the positive effects of financial 
expertise, some research fails to find significant effects. For example, Raghunandan and 
Rama (2003) examine an association between audit committee composition and the 
proportion of shareholders not voting for auditor ratification in the presence of high non-
audit fee ratios. The goal is to see if the presence of a strong audit committee allays any 
loss of independence concerns arising from high levels of non-audit fees. SOX presumes 
that fees for non-audit services may compromise auditors’ independence, leading to 
lower financial reporting quality, and thus bans some of these services for audit clients 
(SOX 2002). In addition, the SEC has asserted that auditor independence influences 
shareholder voting as well as investing decisions. However, it is possible that a strong 
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audit committee may mitigate problems arising from perceptions of weakened auditor 
independence. They find that having at least one member meeting SOX financial 
expertise definition on the audit committee is not associated with the proportion of 
shareholders not voting for auditor ratification in the presence of high nonaudit fees. 
Nevertheless, the insignificance of financial expertise in explaining shareholder votes 
may be due to the use of overly broad definition of financial expertise adopted by the 
stock exchanges. Furthermore, on average, only 1.48 percent of shareholders in the study 
voted against or abstained from auditor ratification so the study may lack economic 
substance and power. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) examine the effects of audit committee characteristics 
on the likelihood of auditor dismissals. Prior research suggests that external auditors are 
more likely to be dismissed after the issuance of an unfavorable report. In order to induce 
reporting integrity, audit committees should in some cases protect external auditors from 
dismissals following such report issuance. Hence, management should be less likely to 
terminate the auditor following the issuance of a going-concern report if the audit 
committee embodies certain characteristics, such as financial expertise, that promote their 
objectivity. Carcello and Neal find that the likelihood of auditor dismissal after a going-
concern report is increasing with the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit 
committee and the percentage of shares held by the committee. However, clients are less 
likely to dismiss the auditor in the presence of audit committee members with governance 
expertise.11 No significant relation between the likelihood of auditor dismissal and the 
                                                 
11 Governance expertise refers to the average number of directorship positions audit committee members 
hold in other public companies. A member’s reputation is expected to suffer when the company fires its 
auditor after a going-concern report and members who sit on more boards will have more to lose. 
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members’ financial expertise is found. Nonetheless, such results may be caused by the 
use of overly broad definition of financial expertise. 
 
2.3.6 Complements and Substitutes of Financial Expertise 
Even if financial expertise improves audit committee effectiveness based on the 
extant empirical evidence, it is debatable whether regulators and the stock markets should 
set requirements for financial expertise. SOX does not postulate the presence of financial 
experts on audit committees, but requires that all members be independent from the 
firm’s management. Audit committees must oversee the accounting and financial 
reporting processes as well as the audit of financial statements. Similarly, the BRC and 
major U.S. stock exchanges strongly advocate certain audit committee characteristics 
including financial expertise. 
For instance, the major U.S. stock exchanges now require that audit committees 
have at least three independent directors. The BRC (1999) recommends that audit 
committees be comprised of a minimum of three members and meet at least quarterly, 
while the NACD (2002) underlined the importance of diligence with the suggestion that 
audit committees have four half-day meetings each year. Therefore, it is possible that 
other audit committee characteristics and activities (e.g., independence, size, diligence, 
and time commitment) serve as complements or substitutes to the need of financial 
expertise on audit committee effectiveness. If there is substantial evidence that other 
audit committee characteristics serve as substitutes to financial expertise, the requirement 
of financial expertise on audit committee composition may impose an unnecessary 
burden to firms and would not be justified based on a cost-benefit analysis. 
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 Current research investigates this issue by analyzing interactions between 
financial expertise and other audit committee characteristics in studies of the association 
between financial expertise and audit committee effectiveness. Most investigate the 
relationship between audit committee independence and financial expertise. DeFond et al. 
(2005) find that a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial 
experts to audit committees is concentrated among firms with fully independent audit 
committees. Carcello et al. (2006) find that the negative relation between earnings 
management and financial expertise is stronger when the audit committee is 100 percent 
independent. 
 In addition to audit committee characteristics, the level of firm democracy may 
affect audit committee effectiveness. Governance mechanisms signal the level of firm 
democracy since more democratic firms are more likely to have governance mechanisms 
in place. These mechanisms may serve as a buffer to prevent the firm’s management 
from interfering with the audit committee’s functions so financial experts can exercise 
their expertise without the fear of disputes with management. DeFond et al. (2005) report 
that appointing accounting financial experts results in the positive market reaction only if 
the firms have strong corporate governance prior to the appointment. In addition, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2006) report that the positive association between audit committee 
accounting expertise and accruals quality is more pronounced for firms with strong audit 
committee governance.12 The findings suggest that financial expertise is likely to 
complement strong governance because firms with stronger governance may be better at 
                                                 
12 The strength of audit committee governance is proxied by a summary measure based on three audit 
committee characteristics: audit committee size, independence, and number of meetings. Dhaliwal et al. 
also examine the interactions between different types of financial expertise and the governance strength of 
the board, measured by board size, board independence, share ownership, and CEO-chair duality but do not 
find significant results. 
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channeling the financial expertise to enhance financial reporting quality, thereby 
increasing shareholder value. 
It is also possible that the strength of other governance mechanisms partially or 
completely substitute for the need of financial expertise on audit committees. For 
instance, Carcello et al. (2006) discover that appointing accounting financial experts to 
firms with good corporate governance has no incremental effect on reducing earnings 
management. This result implies that a lack of financial expertise on the audit committee 
may be compensated for by other corporate governance mechanisms so the requirement 
of financial experts may not be necessary for firms that already have strong corporate 
governance. 
 
2.3.7 Empirical Regularity 
The majority of extant research finds that financial expertise significantly 
improves audit committee effectiveness. Evidence suggests that financial expertise leads 
to lower levels of accrual earnings management, earnings restatement and fraud, while 
enhancing accounting conservatism and internal control quality. However, it is still an 
open question whether financial expertise is a complement or substitute for other 
corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, some research fails to find evidence of 
an association between audit committee effectiveness and financial expertise when the 
broad definition of financial expertise suggested by the final version of SOX is used in 
the study. Particularly, accounting-specific expertise, as described in the SEC’s original 
proposal, is a crucial component of financial expertise to the audit committee’s role. In 
contrast, non-accounting financial expertise, as defined in the final version of the SEC 
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rule, is often not evident as a significant contributor to audit committee effectiveness. 
Thus, research that sheds light on different facets of audit committee members’ 







EXPERIENCE AND EPISODIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
Expertise research, especially in psychology, has a long history. Early expertise 
studies emphasized general problem solving or reasoning skills. However, increasing 
evidence shows that a transfer of expertise across domains is rare. Therefore, despite its 
importance, general ability is not the only important factor that determines experts’ 
performance. Most research in the last decade has shifted the focus from generic ability 
to the role of domain-specific knowledge. A large number of studies indicate that 
domain-specific knowledge is the main cause of experts’ superior judgments and 
decisions. 
Hoffman (1998) defines an expert as one with special skills or knowledge derived 
from domain-relevant experience. The knowledge acquired through experience enables 
experts to make accurate and reliable judgments, and perform their tasks effectively and 
efficiently, even in unusual circumstances. The relationship between expertise and 
knowledge allows researchers to define expertise on a continuum, with more 
knowledgeable people on one end (more expert-like) and less knowledgeable on the other 
end (Chi 2006). Hence, researchers can conduct experiments to compare the performance 
of participants who have obtained a specific level of knowledge relative to those with less 
corresponding knowledge to assess key facets of expertise in a particular domain. 
Extant research concludes that the differences between experts and novices 
largely stem from differences in knowledge. There are many ways to categorize 
knowledge but a useful distinction commonly employed in past accounting research is 
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based on two types of long-term memory: episodic and semantic memory (Libby 1995). 
As proposed by Tulving (1983), episodic memory processes and stores information 
representing unique spatial-temporal contexts of a personally experienced event (or an 
episode). This form of knowledge (episodic knowledge) allows remembering or thinking 
about a past event and usually triggers personal, emotional recollection (Ryan et al. 
2008). It tends to be in the form of visual images encoded from the actor’s perspective 
(Conway 2008). For example, an auditor may remember a previous encounter with a 
client’s executive. Elements such as meeting time, venue, the auditor, the executive and 
their interaction from the auditor’s perspective comprise the episode. Once the episode is 
retrieved from episodic memory, the auditor can re-experience the encounter. This kind 
of knowledge allows individuals to use their knowledge of prior events to construct 
possible future scenarios, which are useful when making predictions. 
Semantic knowledge differs from its episodic counterpart in several ways. First, 
semantic memory involves facts and knowledge about the world. Unlike the retrieval of 
episodic knowledge, semantic recollection is generally factual and lacking emotion or 
time-, place-, and self-reference (Ryan et al. 2008). Second, while episodic knowledge 
enables mental time travel by reliving past events and projecting them into the future, 
semantic knowledge largely benefits inferential and analogical reasoning (Suddendorf 
and Corballis 2008). The usefulness of each type of knowledge depends on task 
requirements: some tasks can be solved in several ways and some require an interaction 
of episodic and semantic knowledge. Third, while the acquisition of episodic knowledge 
typically requires first-hand (direct) experience, attainment of semantic knowledge is 
usually via second-hand (indirect) encounters such as reading facts from books or 
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listening to others. Although it is true that indirect experience can also be captured in an 
episode (e.g., an event in which a person is reading a book), such pallid episodes without 
personal or emotional attributes tend to fade away fast and may not be accessible or 
useful over time (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). 
Prior research on audit committees mainly focuses on the benefit of semantic 
rather than episodic knowledge. For instance, DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find that 
higher audit-reporting semantic knowledge, measured using conceptual questions from 
auditing textbooks and professional accounting examinations, is associated with greater 
support of the auditor in disputes with client-management. Their finding suggests a 
significant benefit of semantic knowledge (e.g., concepts about auditors’ responsibilities) 
to audit committee effectiveness, possibly due to better understanding of the tasks at 
hand. 
McDaniel et al. (2002) study participants with significant and similar amounts of 
business experiences by dividing them into two groups: one with accounting/finance 
experience (financial experts) and another without such experience (financial literates). 
They suggest that financial experts possess more developed experience-based schemas 
for evaluating financial reporting quality, relative to financial literates. Although their 
findings bring to bear the importance of accounting/finance experience to audit 
committee effectiveness, the effects of episodic and semantic knowledge cannot be 
disentangled. After all, financial experts have higher levels of episodic and semantic 
knowledge than financial literates. My paper attempts to examine the potential effect of 







I investigate the effect of relevant episodic knowledge acquired through direct 
experience, on the audit committee member’s propensity to support the auditor in 
auditor-manager disagreements. Professional standards (e.g., GAAP) sometimes use 
vague terms that are prone to exploitation. For instance, vague phrases or wording such 
as “realistic possibility”, “probable”, and “material” are commonly used to describe 
thresholds in disclosure rules (Cuccia et al. 1995). The manager who has an incentive to 
report aggressively may interpret a vague professional standard liberally or excessively 
push the materiality threshold to support his/her preferred position. On the other hand, the 
auditor may have an incentive to interpret the standard conservatively due to concern 
over legal and reputation loss. Even if the standard is precise, Cuccia et al. (1995) find 
that the manager compensates for the loss of latitude in interpreting the vague standard by 
aggressively interpreting evidence supporting their preferred position. Episodic 
knowledge obtained from prior direct experience in the role of auditor or manager may 
help audit committee members better understand the basis and the reasonableness of each 
side’s position in conflicts regarding the interpretation of ambiguous evidence and 
obscure language.  
 Audit committee members who have audit experience have encoded (in long-term 
memory) personally experienced events in the auditor role. When facing auditor-manager 
disagreements, relevant pieces of knowledge would be retrieved and among them could 
be their past interactions with managers. These episodes enable episodic future thinking, 
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ability to project the self into the situation for anticipation of future states (Atance and 
O’Neill 2001). That is, for audit committee members with direct experience as an auditor, 
the episode involving auditor-manager interaction is encoded from the auditor’s 
perspective. This allows them to re-experience being in the role of the auditor. Moreover, 
episodic future thinking should allow them to project what they would do if they were the 
auditor in the current conflict, based on past judgment and behavior in the encoded 
episode. This procedure is consistent with the theory of perspective taking (e.g., see 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974), which specifies that people use their prior knowledge and 
experience to simulate what others do in the same situation. Psychological research 
regards accurate perspective taking as a primary component of social interactions, such as 
business negotiations and group discussions. 
 Not only can cognitive states be recalled through the retrieval of an episode, 
emotions (e.g., how someone makes the subject feel) can be experienced in a recalled 
event. According to Tulving (1983), remembering (episodic knowledge) has affective 
components, but knowing (semantic knowledge) does not. These affective components 
could be critical in perspective taking. For example, Van Boven et al. (2000) find that 
equipping individuals with first-hand experience can help them take another person’s 
perspective accurately when performing tasks involving people in different roles. 
However, the research suggests that acquisition of semantic knowledge alone is 
insufficient for successful perspective taking. It is tenable that people who are equipped 
with semantic knowledge alone could not be able to simulate emotional states of the 
person in the other role. 
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 Episodic knowledge obtained from direct experience as an auditor should lead 
audit committee members to project themselves into the conflict at hand, adopt the 
auditor’s perspective accurately, and, thus, understand how it feels to be in the auditor’s 
shoes. In general, auditors need to have an attitude of professional skepticism, which is 
pervasive across tasks (Libby 1995). In addition, Choo and Trotman (1991) suggest that 
more experienced auditors display a higher level of professional skepticism. Audit 
committee members who can take the auditor’s perspective accurately should empathize 
with the auditor’s need to exhibit professional skepticism (e.g., to be attentive to the 
potential of the manager’s bias). That is, the auditor has to be vigilant when the manager 
may have incentives to manipulate financial reports or to interpret obscure expressions in 
professional standards and fuzzy evidence aggressively. In a situation with a substantial 
degree of uncertainty, episodic knowledge allows one to reflect on prior experience and 
act accordingly: for instance, to be particularly vigilant or to avoid the point of danger 
(Baddeley 1993). Thus, episodic knowledge obtained through auditor experience should 
help audit committee members accurately simulate the mental state of the auditor in 
disagreements, resulting in more empathy towards the auditor. 
 In addition to cognitive and emotion states, one’s actions are another major 
element in an episode. Because auditors are responsible for constraining managers’ 
aggressive reporting behavior, diligent auditors are expected to make relatively more 
conservative judgment than lax auditors. Hence, once past encounters with managers are 
retrieved, diligent auditors are more likely to remember their past conservative actions. 
The retrieved conservative actions should be consistent to the actions of the auditor 
disagreeing with the manager. Thus, I expect that audit committee members who have 
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prior experience as a diligent auditor sides with the auditor because the similarities of 
their past actions and mental states to those of the auditor in conflict. In contrast, 
relatively lax auditors have not encoded as many episodes in which they act 
conservatively. Hence, the effect of retrieved past actions on a level of auditor support 
may be limited. Therefore, episodic knowledge acquired through past experience as a 
diligent auditor should enhance a degree of auditor support to a larger extent than the 
knowledge attained through experience as a lax auditor. Accordingly, I make the 
following hypotheses. 
 
H1a: Episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor leads to a 
greater level of auditor support. 
 
 
H1b: Episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as a relatively diligent 
auditor leads to a greater level of auditor support than such knowledge from 
prior experience as a relatively lax auditor. 
 
 Episodic knowledge from direct experience as a manager is less straightforward 
than from direct experience as an auditor (i.e., whether it affects the level of audit support 
in disagreements). In practice, some managers may have an incentive to report 
aggressively while others are more conservative. Audit committee members who have 
been in the role of aggressive (conservative) managers encode episodes involving 
auditor-manager interactions from the aggressive (conservative) manager’s perspective. 
When projecting themselves into the current conflict, aggressive (conservative) managers 
are more likely to anticipate future states assuming a high probability of aggressive 
(conservative) reporting. In other words, the behavior of managers in their simulation is 
closer to their past behavior when they took the same position. The failure to fully 
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appreciate the difference between self and others (egocentric bias) is common in social 
interactions (e.g., see Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Van Boven et al. 2000; Epley et al. 
2004). Those who previously provided aggressive reports store more cases in which the 
manager is biased in memory, so they likely assume that other managers also provide 
aggressive reports. As a result, in an auditor-manager dispute, they should provide more 
support to the auditor due to a higher sensitivity to the manager’s potential to report 
aggressively (e.g., by exploiting the ambiguity in accounting standards or audit 
evidence). 
 In contrast, those who reported conservatively have episodic knowledge that 
involves a more objective manager. When they try to take the manager’s perspective, 
they are more likely to retrieve episodes in which the manager reported conservatively. 
As a result, they may adhere to their own conservative reporting, but fail to take into 
account the fact that other managers may have an incentive to report aggressively. 
Moreover, when the auditor-manager disagreement involves ambiguity in reporting 
standards or evidence, audit committee members with conservative manager experience 
may retrieve previous cases that allow them to justify the manager’s interpretation. For 
example, in the case of probable litigation cost, a manager selects the reporting decision 
that portrays events favorably, by not providing a disclosure (Cuccia et al. 1995). 
Episodic knowledge as a conservative manager may increase the audit committee 
member’s tendency to believe that the manager’s accounting choice truly represents the 
firm’s financial position. Thus, episodic knowledge of a conservative manager may not 




H2a: Episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager leads to a greater level of auditor support. 
 
 
H2b: Episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as a conservative 
manager does not affect a level of auditor support. 
 
















5.1 Study Overview 
The major objectives of the preliminary study are to provide a broad idea of how 
an audit committee member’s episodic knowledge obtained in the role of an auditor or a 
manager affects his/her decision making and to test the experiment protocol. The 
preliminary study entails two tasks. I use simpler (abstract) tasks in the experiment to 
control for possible prior knowledge differences among subjects.13 The experiment 
includes three groups: (1) the auditor group, (2) the manager group, and (3) the control 
group. Participants in the first two groups complete both the first (auditor-manager) and 
second (audit committee) tasks, whereas participants in the control group only complete 
the latter task. The experimental design allows me to examine the effects of episodic 
knowledge obtained in the auditor’s role and that from the manager’s role, separately. 
A total of 82 undergraduates of Georgia Institute of Technology participated in 
the experiment. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups, with 
approximately the same number per group. 
In the first (auditor-manager) task, each participant in the auditor group is 
assigned the role of auditor while each participant in the manager group is assigned the 
role of manager.14 At the beginning of each round, auditor-manager pairings are 
randomly determined. Participants are never informed of the identity of their paired 
                                                 
13 An abstract setting is used in the experiment to avoid the potential effects of participants’ prior 
knowledge and experience. However, I use contextually rich terminology in this paper for expositional 
convenience. 
14 The experimental materials refer to the auditor as the “Receiver” and the manager as the “Sender” to 
prevent the potential effects of descriptive labels. 
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partner. The role assigned to each participant does not change throughout the experiment. 
This task is designed to provide participants with episodic knowledge from experience as 
an auditor or a manager. The second (audit committee) task is an individual task in which 
each participant is assigned a role of audit committee member.15 Participants in the 
auditor group and the manager group perform this task after completing the first task. In 
contrast, participants in the control group read the instructions of the first task and then 
partake in the audit committee task. 
 
5.2 Procedures 
5.2.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
The auditor-manager task simulates the auditor-manager strategic relationship in a 
financial reporting context. The main purpose of the task is to provide participants with 
different kinds of episodic knowledge, which may enhance their level of auditor support 
in the next (audit committee) task.  
In financial reporting, managers generally have more complete information about 
their own company, compared to auditors, and report the company’s earnings with some 
level of discretion. Aggressive managers have an incentive to provide a biased report 
while conservative managers have an incentive to report accurately. By comparison, 
auditors are expected to constrain overly-aggressive reporting. In addition, auditors face 
an asymmetric loss function, making them more concerned with income-increasing 
earnings management than income-decreasing earnings management (i.e., being more 
conservative). If the manager’s reported value is deemed to be materially misstated, an 
                                                 
15 The experimental materials call the audit committee member the “Predictor.” 
43 
 
auditor-manager dispute arises and the audit committee may intervene. Both parties are 
expected to exert effort and spend time in the meeting and its preparation. 
At the beginning of each round, a commodity value is determined by drawing two 
integers with replacement from a uniform distribution U(0, 50). The commodity value is 
the sum of the two integers, thus ranging from 0 to 100, with an expected value of 50. 
One of the two integers is then selected at random and given to all auditors and managers 
so that integer becomes public knowledge. However, only the managers are informed of 
the commodity value (the sum of the two integers). The managers also know which 
integer is public knowledge and which one is their private knowledge. 
 The manager is the first mover in this task. After knowing the two integers, the 
manager submits a reported value to the paired auditor. The auditor then (1) estimates the 
commodity value, and (2) chooses either his/her estimate or the manager’s reported value 
as the final estimate of commodity value (i.e., reject or accept the manager’s report). 






Procedure in Auditor-Manager Task 
 
Use Own 















Use the Reported 




The payoff functions of an auditor and a manager are common knowledge to all 
players. The manager’s payoff increases with the manager’s reported value as long as the 
reported value is accepted by the auditor. The payoff equals 1 Lira16 times the reported 
value. However, if the reported value is rejected by the auditor, then his/her payoff 
becomes 60 percent of the actual commodity value. Figure 3 depicts the payoffs to all 
players. 
The auditor’s payoff increases with the accuracy of his/her final estimate of the 
commodity value (his/her own or the manager’s estimate, whichever is chosen). The 
auditor receives a reward of 50 Liras if the estimate error (the final estimate –the actual 
value) falls within the range of -15 to 10 Liras, or 10 Liras otherwise.17 Moreover, 10 
Liras are deducted from the auditor’s payoff if he/she rejects the manager’s reported 
value and uses his/her own estimate of the commodity’s value as the final estimate.18 In 
addition, the auditor earns a bonus based on the accuracy of his/her own estimate, 
regardless of whether he/she uses the manager’s reported value or own estimate. The 
bonus is calculated as a linear function of the absolute error in the auditor’s estimate: 
(100 - |auditor’s estimate – the actual commodity value|)/10. Therefore, the auditor can 
earn up to 10 Liras in bonus, in addition to the payoff shown in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
16 Lira is an experimental currency used for the commodity valuation. 
17 The acceptable range is asymmetric around zero because auditors generally prefer conservative 
accounting choice due to litigation risk concerns (e.g., see DeFond and Subramanyam 1998). Hence, they 
are more likely to focus on income-increasing as opposed to income-decreasing earnings management. 
18 The cost of 10 Liras is imposed because auditors typically have to exert more effort (e.g., gathering more 












   Auditor’s Bonus = (100 - |Estimate Error|)/10. 
 









Payoffs in Auditor-Manager Task (Preliminary Study) 
Auditor’s Acceptance 
of Manager’s Reported 
Value 
-15 ≤ Estimate Error ≤ 10 












of Manager’s Reported 
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Once both players finish their actions, their payoffs are calculated and each player 
is privately informed of his/her payoff for the round. Participants are re-paired and the 
new round begins. This task is repeated for four rounds. The participants receive cash 
payment according to their payoffs in a randomly chosen round at the rate of 5 Liras per 
dollar.19  
 For this first task, participants in the control group only read the instructions but 
do not have the opportunity to participate. Hence, after this task is done, the participants 
in the auditor (manager) group are assumed to obtain episodic knowledge in the auditor 
(manager)’s role, while those in the control group lack such episodic knowledge. 
 
5.2.2 Second Task (Audit Committee) 
After the first task is completed, all participants (in all three experimental groups) 
immediately participate in the audit committee task, which involves auditor-manager 
disagreements. All participants assume the role of audit committee member, whose task 
is to predict the commodity value. No feedback is given in this task to curtail any 
learning opportunity.20 
This task consists of five rounds. At the beginning of each round, participants (in 
the role of an audit committee member) receive information from a randomly selected 
disagreement when the manager reports aggressively and the auditor’s estimate is closer 
                                                 
19 To expedite the experiment, participants are paid once they finish all experimental tasks. In addition, they 
do not know their cash payoffs until the end of experiment. The objective of this treatment is to prevent any 
potential effect (e.g., induced positive or negative emotional states) that cash payments may have on their 
judgment in the subsequent task. 
20 No feedback is provided in this task because experience as an audit committee member is not the focus 
of this paper. 
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to the commodity value than the manager’s reported value.21 The audit committee 
members are informed of (1) the integer that is public knowledge, (2) the manager’s 
reported value, and (3) the auditor’s own estimate of the commodity’s value. Then, they 
are asked to (1) predict which of the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s own 
estimate is closer to the actual commodity value, and (2) predict the actual commodity 
value. 
The audit committee member’s payoff increases with the proximity of his/her 
estimate (E) to the actual commodity value (A).22 Specifically, each player receives a 
reward of 50 Liras minus the absolute prediction error (50 - |E – A|). In addition, he/she 
receives an additional 20 Liras if his/her prediction regarding which of the manager’s 
reported value and the auditor’s own estimate is closer to the actual commodity value is 
correct. The task is repeated five rounds. As in the first task, participants are paid based 
on their performance in a randomly selected round using a conversion rate of 5 Liras per 
dollar. Afterwards, the experimenter, with the help of assistants, calculates each 
participant’s monetary payoff, asks them to complete a post-experiment questionnaire 
(PEQ), and pays them in cash. The PEQ includes manipulation checks to ensure 
participants’ understanding of the experimental tasks. In addition, the PEQ elicits 
responses to provide insight into the processes that the participants used to come up with 
their decisions. All instructions are shown in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
21 For convenience, the disagreements used in the task are pre-selected from a prior session of the 
experiment. Also, to prevent experimental noise, all participants receive the same set of information in each 
round of the task. 
22 Bedard et al. (2004) indicate that unlike auditors, audit committee members do not have an asymmetric 




5.3 Experiment Predictions 
5.3.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
The auditor-manager task can be described as a dynamic game of complete but 
imperfect information.23 Players move in sequence; the manager first followed by the 
auditor. The payoff functions are common knowledge to both players but the auditor does 
not know whether the manager’s report contains an acceptable error (between -15 and 
10). Figure 4 depicts the extensive game form representation of this game. 
 
                                                 
23 The game consists of multiple rounds and players are informed of their payoffs privately at the end of 
each round. Players may update their beliefs by incorporating new information so the equilibrium strategies 




 Where V = Actual Commodity Value (Integer I + Integer II) 
 R = Manager’s Reported Value 
E = Auditor’s Estimate of Commodity Value 
β = Probability that Manager’s Reported Value Contains an Within-Range Error 
(between -15 and 10) 
θ = 60% 
 
Figure 4 
Extensive Game Form Representation of Auditor-Manager Task 
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(θV, 40)  
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Appendix B shows detailed calculations of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
Given the knowledge about the unknown integer, the auditor can calculate the probability 
that the manager’s reported value is within the acceptable range, as depicted in Table 1. 
Therefore, the equilibrium exists when the manager reports a value of the publicly known 




The Probability of Acceptable Error (between -15 and 10) in Auditor-Manager Task 
 
Reported Number less 
































Despite such equilibrium, the actual behavior may differ from the conventional 
economic prediction. After all, prior research indicates that individuals do not actually 
calculate equilibrium strategies before making decisions, but rather use the trial-and-error 
strategies (Cameror 2003). Because each auditor and manager’s beliefs about one another 
may vary and change over time through learning from outcome feedback, I do not make 
concrete predictions about their behavior. However, I expect that managers try to report 
the highest value that still makes the auditor believe in the report accuracy. In addition, 
the auditor’s rate of acceptance should decrease with the reported value. 
 
5.3.2 Second Task (Auditor Committee) 
I construct the experiment in a way that all participants have conceptual 
(semantic) knowledge of the incentives of both the auditor and the manager, so they can 
form ideas toward individuals in each role. However, participants in each of the three 
groups have different types of experience, obtained from the first task, so their episodic 
knowledge varies. I expect participants assigned to the auditor (manager) group to have 
episodic knowledge from direct experience as an auditor (a manager). Participants in the 
control group do not have relevant episodic knowledge because they do not complete the 
first task. 
I use two variables, SUPPORT and MIDDIFF, to capture the level of auditor 
support in a disagreement. The dichotomous variable SUPPORT equals 1 if the 
participant agrees that the actual commodity value is closer to the auditor’s estimate than 
the manager’s reported value, or 0 otherwise. MIDDIFF is the difference between the 
participant’s estimate and the middle point between the manager’s reported value and the 
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auditor’s estimate. The higher value of SUPPORT and the lower value of MIDDIFF 
denote the high level of auditor support. 
The first set of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) focus on the impact of episodic 
knowledge acquired from direct experience as an auditor on judgment regarding auditor-
manager disagreements. In contrast, the second set of hypotheses (H2a and H2b) pertains 
to the effect of episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as a manager. H1a 
and H1b imply that the auditor group should provide greater auditor support than the 
control group. In addition, the level of auditor support should be positively associated 
with their conservative behavior when assuming the auditor role. Taken together, H2a 
and H2b suggest that the manager group could have greater auditor support than the 
control group. Furthermore, the greater support should be attributable to the participants 
who reported aggressively when they were in the manager role. 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
The results of the first (auditor-manager) task are summarized in Table 2. As 
shown in Panel A, managers tend to overstate the commodity value. On average, the 
manager’s reported value is 9.75 above the actual commodity value and 10.05 above the 
middle of possible range (the publicly known integer + 25). Auditors tend to discount the 
manager’s reported value, as reported in Panel B. On average, the auditor’s estimate is 
5.38 less than the manager’s reported value. However, the auditor’s adjustment does not 
totally remove the manager’s bias since the average auditor’s estimate is 4.37 above the 
actual value and 4.67 above the middle of possible range. About two-thirds of the 
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manager’s reports are accepted by the auditor. However, Figure 5 depicts that the 
auditor’s acceptance rate generally decreases with the manager’s reported value. All in 
all, the first task is successful in allowing participants to gain experience in the 
commodity valuation task in which specific incentives are used to simulate an auditor-











a Middle of Possible Range equals to the publicly known integer plus 25. 





Panel A: Manager’s Report 
Variable Mean  Median  
Standard 
Deviation 
Reported Value 56.59  
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15.953 
 
Reported Value less Publicly Known 
Integer  35.05  34  12.752 
 
Reported Value less Actual Value 9.75 *** 9  12.242  
Reported Value less Middle of Possible 
Rangea 




       
Panel B: Auditor’s Estimation 




Estimate 51.21  50.5  12.815 
 
Estimate  less Publicly Known Integer 29.67  29  9.856  
Estimate less Actual Value 4.37 *** 5.5  13.163  
Estimate less Middle of Possible Range 4.67 *** 4  9.856  
       
Panel C: Auditor’s Propensity to Accept Manager’s Report 
       
Situation Percentage      
Overall 66.96%      
 (47.20%)      
       
When Manager’s Reported Value > 
Actual Value 
65.85%      
(47.70%)      
       
When Manager’s Reported Value > 
Middle of Possible Range 
62.07%      
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Next, I test the hypotheses using participants’ decisions in the second (audit 
committee) task of the experiment. In the auditor-manager task, the differences between 
the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate when the auditor rejects the 
manager’s report range from -11 to 46, with the mean of 10.76. In the selected cases used 
in the audit committee member task, managers’ reported values exceed auditors’ estimate 
by 8.40 on average, ranging from 7 to 10. Therefore, the selected cases of auditor-
manager disputes used in the second task are good representatives of auditor-manager 
disputes with medium magnitude. 
 
5.4.2 Second Task (Auditor Committee) 
The first variable of interest is SUPPORT, which indicates whether a participant 
believes that the auditor’s estimate is more accurate than the manager’s reported value. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the frequencies of participants’ first predictions (SUPPORT) 
by group. Participants in the control group provide substantially less support to the 
auditor (33.57 percent) than those in the other groups (51.11 percent for the auditor group 
and 52.59 percent for the manager group). Participants in the auditor and the manager 
groups are relatively similar in their likelihood to support the auditor. The chi-square test 
of independence is statistically significant (p-value = 0.002) thus whether a participant 




Task II Descriptive Statistics (Preliminary Study) 
 
 
Panel A: Participants’ Responses (SUPPORT) 
       
Group Auditor   Manager  Total  
Control 47  93  140  
Auditor 69  64  135  
Manager 71  66  135  
Total 187  223  410  
       
Pearson Chi2 12.479      
Prob > Chi2  0.002 ***     
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of SUPPORT and MIDDIFF a 
       
 SUPPORT                                 MIDDIFF 
Group Percentage Mean  Median  Standard Deviation 
Control 33.57% 0.786  0.500  6.649  
Auditor 51.11% -0.407  0.500  4.871  
Manager 52.59% -1.341  -0.500  4.206  
Total 45.61% -0.307  0.500  5.418  
       
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT equals 1 if the predictor agrees that the actual commodity value is closer to the auditor’s 
estimate than the manager’s reported value, or 0 otherwise. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the predictor’s estimate and the middle point between the 






The second variable of interest is MIDDIFF, which is the difference between the 
participant’s estimate and the middle point between the manager’s reported value and the 
auditor’s estimate. This variable adds on SUPPORT because it gauges the strength, in 
addition to the existence, of participants’ auditor support. Panel B of Table 3 displays that 
the mean and median of MIDDIFF are close to zero so participants’ estimates, on 
average, are around half way between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s 
estimate. The more negative the MIDDIFF, the more support the participant provides to 
the auditor. In contrast, the more positive the MIDDIFF, the more support the participant 
provides to the manager, and less to the auditor. According to Table 3, the average 
estimate of participants in the control group is closer to the manager’s reported value, 
while the average estimates of those in the auditor and manager groups are closer to the 
auditor’s estimate. 
 The above results manifest the potential benefits of relevant episodic knowledge 
in audit committee members’ judgment. Next, I run two regression models (Table 4) to 
investigate the effects of episodic knowledge from direct experience as an auditor and the 
knowledge from prior experience as a manager on auditor support. The first regression 
(Panel A) is a logit model that regresses SUPPORT on two dummy variables, Auditor 
and Manager. Auditor equals 1 if the participant was in the auditor group or 0 otherwise, 
while Manager equals 1 if the participant was in the manager group or 0 otherwise. The 
second regression (Panel B) is a linear model that regresses MIDDIFF on Auditor and 
Manager. The first regression examines the relationship between participants’ episodic 
knowledge and their valence of auditor support and the second regression investigates the 




Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II (Preliminary Study) 
 
 
Panel A: Logistic Model of SUPPORT Regressed on Auditor and Manager’s 
Perspectivesa 
ManagerAuditorSUPPORT 210 βββ ++=  








Intercept  -0.682  0.219  0.002 *** 
Auditor + 0.727  0.308  0.018 *** 
Manager + 0.786  0.287  0.006 *** 
        
Prob > Chi2  0.014 **     
Pseudo R2 0.022      
 
 
Panel B: Linear Models of MIDDIFF Regressed on Auditor and Manager’s 
Perspectivesa 
ManagerAuditorMIDDIFF 210 βββ ++=  




Sign Coefficient  
Standard 
 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  0.786  0.698  0.264  
Auditor - -1.193  0.900  0.189 * 
Manager - -2.126  0.818  0.011 *** 
        
Prob > F  0.034 **     
R2 0.026      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT equals 1 if the predictor agrees that the actual commodity value is closer to the auditor’s 
estimate than the manager’s reported value, or 0 otherwise. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the predictor’s estimate and the middle point between the 
manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
Auditor equals 1 if the predictor was designated as an auditor in Task I, or 0 otherwise. 
Manager equals 1 if the predictor was designated as a manager in Task I, or 0 otherwise. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 




I expect the coefficient of Auditor to be positive for the first regression 
(SUPPORT) but negative for the second regression (MIDDIFF). As shown in Panel A of 
Table 4, episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor significantly 
increases the participant’s likelihood to side with the auditor (one-sided p-value = 0.009). 
In addition, Panel B of Table 4 shows that on average, the estimates of participants with 
such episodic knowledge are closer to the auditor’s estimate than the control group, and 
this effect is marginally significant (one-sided p-value = 0.095). 
According to Panel A of Table 4, episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
manager significantly increases participants’ propensity to side with the auditor (one-
sided p-value = 0.003). Furthermore, as shown in Panel B, the estimates of participants 
with such episodic knowledge are significantly closer to the auditor’s estimate than the 
manager’s reported value (one-sided p-value = 0.006). 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the breakdown of positive and negative estimation 
errors by experimental group. The control group appears more likely to overestimate the 
commodity value than do the other two groups. However, the chi-square test of 
independence suggests that there is no difference in signs of estimation errors among 
groups (p-value = 0.166). Therefore, episodic knowledge does not significantly affect the 
likelihood that a participant makes positive or negative estimation errors. This suggests 
that both the auditor and the manager groups provide more support to auditors in auditor-




Relationships between Decisions in Task I and Task II (Preliminary Study) 
 
Panel A: Breakdown of Positive and Negative Estimation Errors 
      
Group 
Understatement 
or No Error   Overstatement  Total 
Control 7  21  28 
Auditor 12  15  27 
Manager 13  14  27 
Total 32  50  82 
      
Pearson Chi2 3.592     
Prob > Chi2  0.166     
 
Panel B:  Correlations between decisions in Task I and Task II 
       
   Discount in Task II   
Manager’s inflation in 
Task I 
Pearson Correlation 
Probability (2-tailed)  
0.496 
0.009 ***  
 
Auditor’s discount in 
Task I 
Pearson Correlation 
Probability (2-tailed)  
0.294 







Next, I conduct an analysis to shed light on whether the benefits of episodic 
knowledge depend on the participant’s decisions in the auditor-manager task. This 
analysis is important in differentiating between judgments of aggressive vs. conservative 
managers and diligent vs. lax auditors. For the manager group, I test the association 
between the degree that the participants inflate the value in the first task and the degree 
that the participants discount the manager’s report (auditor support) in the second task. I 
expect that the more the participant inflates the commodity value in the first task (more 
aggressive), the more he/she discounts the manager’s report in the second task. Panel B 
displays the results from the correlation analysis. The positive and statistically significant 
correlation (one-sided p-value = 0.005) between inflation in the first task and discount in 
the second task lends support to my conjecture. 
For the auditor group, I test the association between the degrees that the 
participants discount the manager’s reported value in the first and second tasks. The more 
discount placed on the manager’s reported value in the first task implies more diligent 
behavior for the auditor. I find a marginally significant, positive correlation (one-sided p-
value = 0.068). Hence, the magnitude of auditor support of the auditor group is positively 
related with the participants’ diligence when taking the role of an auditor in the auditor-
manager task.  
 
5.4.3 Results after a Median Split 
 The above correlation analysis suggests that the impact of episodic knowledge 
from experience as an auditor and a manager on auditor support depend on the auditor’s 
and the manager’s behavior in the episodes encoded in their memory. To provide more 
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concrete evidence, I categorize participants in the auditor and manager groups into four 
subgroups based on their past behavior. For the auditor group, participants whose average 
commodity estimate, while taking the role of an auditor, is below (above) the median 
value are classified as diligent (lax) auditors. For the manager group, participants whose 
average reported value, when they were in the manager role, is below (above) the median 
value are categorized as conservative (aggressive) managers. Table 6 provides the 
descriptive statistics of each subgroup. As expected, aggressive managers significantly 
reported higher values than the conservative counterparts and diligent auditors made 
significantly lower estimates in the auditor-manager task (all p-values = 0.001).24 
                                                 
24 Although diligent auditors are more likely to reject the reported value than lax auditors, the difference is 




Summary of Task I Results after Median Split (Preliminary Study) 
 
Panel A: Manager’s Report 
 
a Middle of Possible Range equals to the publicly known integer plus 25. 










Managers   
Reported Value  less Publicly Known 
Integer         39.13              31.26 ***  
 (12.89)  (11.48)   
Reported Value less Actual Value          13.81               5.97 ***  
 (13.81)  (9.18)   
Reported Value less Middle of Possible 
Rangea 
        14.13               6.26 ***  
 (12.89)  (11.48)   
      
Panel B: Auditor’s Estimation and Propensity to Accept Manager’s Report 





Auditors   
Estimate  less Publicly Known Integer         25.46              33.32 ***  
 (7.36)  (10.33)   
Estimate less Manager’s Reported Value         -9.00               -2.25 ***  
 (9.79)  (6.76)   
Estimate less Actual Value          0.21               7.97 ***  
 (11.93)  (13.21)   
Acceptance of Manager’s Report      
    Overall 61.50%  71.70%   
 (49.10%)  (45.40%)   
    When Manager’s Reported Value > 
    Actual Value 
59.50%  71.10% 
 
 
 (49.80%)  (45.80%)   
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 Table 7 denotes the descriptive statistics of participants’ responses in the audit 
committee task by subgroup (plus the control group). Panel A entails the frequencies of 
SUPPORT for each subgroup. The chi-square test of independence is statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.001) indicating that there is a significant difference in SUPPORT 
among subgroups. Panel B displays that the summary statistics of SUPPORT and 
MIDDIFF. The average estimate of the control group is the closest to the manager’s 





Task II Descriptive Statistics after Median Split (Preliminary Study) 
 
 
Panel A: Participants’ Responses (SUPPORT) 
       
Group Auditor   Manager  Total  
Control 47  93  140  
Diligent Auditor 34  31  65  
Lax Auditor 35  35  70  
Aggressive Manager 41  24  65  
Conservative Manager 30  40  70  
Total 187  223  410  
       
Pearson Chi2 18.106      
Prob > Chi2  0.001 ***     
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of SUPPORT and MIDDIFF a 
       
 SUPPORT MIDDIFF 
Group Percentage Mean  Median  
Standard 
Deviation 
Control 33.57% 0.786  0.500  6.649  
Diligent Auditor 52.31% -1.185  -0.500  5.360  
Lax Auditor 50.00% 0.314  0.500  4.282  
Aggressive Manager 63.08% -2.708  0.500  5.001  
Conservative Manager 42.86% -0.071  -2.500  2.786  
Total 45.61% -0.307  0.500  5.418  
       
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT equals 1 if the predictor agrees that the actual commodity value is closer to the auditor’s 
estimate than the manager’s reported value, or 0 otherwise. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the predictor’s estimate and the middle point between the 





 I run two regression models as shown in Table 8 to test my hypotheses. The first 
regression model (Panel A) is a logit model that regresses SUPPORT on four dummy 
variables, AuditorDil, AuditorLax, ManagerAgg and ManagerCon. AuditorDil 
(AuditorLax) equals 1 if the participant is classified as a diligent (lax) auditor or 0 
otherwise. ManagerAgg (ManagerCon) equals 1 if the participant is classified as an 
aggressive (conservative) manager or 0 otherwise. The second regression model (Panel 
B) is a linear model that regresses MIDDIFF on the four dummy variables. The two 
regressions aim at investigating the effect of episodic knowledge obtained from different 














Panel A: Logistic Model of SUPPORT Regressed on Auditor and Manager’s 
Perspectivesa 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 23210 βββββ ++++=  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  -0.682  0.219  0.002 *** 
AuditorDil + 0.749  0.411  0.069 ** 
AuditorLax + 0.709  0.357  0.047 ** 
ManagerAgg + 1.422  0.337  0.000 *** 
ManagerCon 0 0.217  0.297  0.465  
21 ββ −  +     0.929  
        
Prob > Chi2  0.000 ***     
Pseudo R2 0.043      
 
Panel B: Linear Models of MIDDIFF Regressed on Auditor and Manager’s 
Perspectivesa 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 23210 βββββ ++++=  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  0.786  0.698  0.264  
AuditorDil + -1.802  1.145  0.119 * 
AuditorLax + -0.706  0.989  0.477  
ManagerAgg + -3.555  0.902  0.000 *** 
ManagerCon 0 -0.800  0.790  0.314  
21 ββ −  +     0.340  
        
Prob > F  0.001 ***     
R2 0.051      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT equals 1 if the predictor agrees that the actual commodity value is closer to the auditor’s 
estimate than the manager’s reported value, or 0 otherwise. 
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MIDDIFF is the difference between the predictor’s estimate and the middle point between the 
manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the predictor was classified as a diligent auditor in Task I, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the predictor was classified as a diligent auditor in Task I, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the predictor was classified as an aggressive manager in Task I, or 0 
otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the predictor was classified as a conservative manager in Task I, or 0 
otherwise. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 
c Two-sided probability. 
 
 According to H1a and H2a, I expect the coefficients of AuditorDil, AuditorLax 
and ManagerAgg to be positive for the first regression (SUPPORT) but negative for the 
second regression (MIDDIFF). As shown in Panel A of Table 4, episodic knowledge 
obtained from experience as a diligent auditor, a lax auditor and an aggressive manager 
increases the participant’s tendency to side with the auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.035, 
0.024 and 0.000). Panel B indicates that episodic knowledge obtained from prior 
experience as a diligent auditor and an aggressive manager significantly reduces the 
participant’s estimate (one-sided p-values = 0.060 and 0.000) but episodic knowledge 
from the experience of a lax auditor does not (one-sided p-value = 0.239). 
 H1b predicts that episodic knowledge from previous experience as a diligent 
auditor results in a higher level of auditor support than the experience as a lax auditor. 
Although the magnitude of coefficients for the auditor group is larger in both models, I 
fail to find a significant differences between the two effects (one-sided p-values = 0.465 
and 0.170, respectively). Nevertheless, the finding that only episodic knowledge from 
prior experience as a diligent auditor significantly reduces the participant’s estimate 
implies the stronger influence on auditor support, compared to the knowledge from 
having been a lax auditor. Consistent with H2b, the coefficients of ManagerCon are not 
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statistically significant in both models (p-values = 0.465 and 0.314). Overall, the results 
largely support H1a, H2a and H2b but portray a fuzzy picture regarding H1b. 
  
5.5 Discussion 
Results of the preliminary study indicate that episodic knowledge from prior 
experience as an auditor or a manager can strengthen audit committee auditor support. 
While the benefit of episodic knowledge from prior experience as a manager may be 
limited only to ones who have reported aggressively, it is not as clear whether the 
usefulness of episodic knowledge from experience as an auditor depends on their past 
behavior (i.e., being diligent or being lax). Subsequently, I revise my experiment design 
and conduct another study that allows me to compare the effects of episodic knowledge 
of an auditor and a manager based on both their past incentives as well as past actions in 
the encoded episodes. Although my preliminary study suggests that the experiment 
protocol is generally effective, I make certain modifications to increase external and 






6.1 Study Overview 
I conduct an experiment, consisting of two tasks, to investigate the effect of an 
audit committee member’s enriched long-term memory, from relevant episodic 
knowledge, on his/her judgment regarding auditor-manager disagreements. The two tasks 
are quite similar to the ones used in the preliminary study. Nonetheless, there are several 
important distinctions. 
First, I directly manipulate the types of managers and auditors in this study based 
on their incentives. A manager can be either an aggressive or conservative type, while an 
auditor can be either a diligent or lax type. This manipulation allows me to observe the 
effects of different types of episodic knowledge based on their past incentives, in addition 
to their past behavior. According to Foley and Ratner (2001), an episode likely delineates 
the interplay between the internal, psychological world and the external, physical world. I 
expect that the classification of auditor and manager types based on their incentives aims 
relatively more attention at the psychological perspective (e.g., thoughts, planning and 
perception of the situation, while the classification based on their actions angles more 
toward the physical perspective (e.g., actions and outcomes). 
Second, I measure each participant’s task-relevant conceptual (semantic) 
knowledge and risk attitude. In the preliminary study, I assume that before participating 
in the audit committee task, participants in the manager, the auditor, and the control 
groups only differ in their levels of episodic knowledge. However, direct experience as 
74 
 
an auditor or a manager might lead to a greater level of relevant semantic knowledge as 
well. My experimental results may also be affected by participants’ risk attitude. Hence, I 
control for these possibilities in this study. 
 Third, I introduce more ambiguity pertaining to the commodity value in this 
study. In the preliminary study, managers knew the actual commodity value with 
certainty. To make the tasks more corresponding to the idea that managers may interpret 
evidence aggressively or conservatively, managers in the main study are only informed of 
the range that contains the actual commodity value. 
A total of 100 students (83 undergraduate and 17 graduate students) of Georgia 
Institute of Technology participated in the experiment. The participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the five groups, with approximately the same number per group. Five 
experimental groups include (1) diligent auditor group, (2) lax auditor group, (3) 
aggressive manager group, (4) conservative manager group, and (5) control (no episodic 
knowledge) group.25 Participants in the first four groups complete the auditor-manager 
task before performing the audit committee tasks, thus providing them opportunity to 
gain relevant semantic and episodic knowledge. In contrast, participants in the control 
group only read the instructions of the auditor-manager task (to gain semantic 
knowledge) before partaking in the audit committee task. The experimental design 
enables me to investigate the effects of varying episodic knowledge on participants’ 
judgment, while controlling for the level of semantic knowledge. 
 
                                                 
25 The design is the only feasible way to control participants’ prior experience in the role of an auditor or a 




Participants were first asked to make ten-paired lottery-choices decisions 
(Appendix C), as adapted from Holt and Laury (2002). The main purpose of these 
decisions is to ensure similarity in risk preference across group. For each decision, 
participants can choose between a relatively safe option (an outcome of $4 or $3.20) and 
a risky option (an outcome of $7.70 or $0.20). However, the probability of higher 
outcome varies for each decision (from 10 percent to 100 percent with increments of 10 
percent). Risk-neutral individuals are expected to choose the risky option only when the 
probability of a higher outcome is 50 percent or more. 
Instructions (as shown in Appendix D) are distributed and read aloud by the 
experimenter. Participants are given ample time to read them and ask questions before the 
experiment begins. In the first (auditor-manager) task, each participant is designated the 
role of a diligent auditor, a lax auditor, an aggressive manager or a conservative 
manager.26 At the beginning of each round, auditor-manager pairings are randomly 
determined. Participants are never informed of the identity of their paired partner. The 
role assigned to each participant does not change throughout the experiment. The primary 
purpose of this task is to provide participants with relevant episodic knowledge before 
participating in the next task. The second (audit committee) task is an individual task in 
which each participant is assigned the role of an audit committee member.27 Participants 
in the auditor and manager groups perform this task after the first task is completed. In 
                                                 
26 The experimental materials refer to the auditor (both diligent and lax), the aggressive manager, and the 
conservative manager as the “Receiver”, “Type X Sender”, and “Type Y Sender”, respectively, to prevent 
the potential effects of descriptive labels. 
27 The experimental materials call the audit committee member the “Predictor.” 
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contrast, participants in the control group only read the instructions of the first task and 
then perform the second task. 
 
6.2.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
Like the preliminary study, the auditor-manager task resembles the auditor-
manager relationship in a financial reporting context. In this task, the aggressive 
(conservative) manager group is paired with the diligent (lax) auditor group. All auditors 
have the same payoff function while those of aggressive and conservative managers 
differ. The experimenter announces to all participants that in half of the sessions, the 
managers will be aggressive and the other half conservative. The experimenter also 
declares the type of managers in a session to all participants in that session. The payoff 
functions of an auditor, an aggressive manager and a conservative manager are common 
knowledge to all players. 
The commodity value is determined in a similar way as in the preliminary study 
(a sum of two integers, each of which can be any integer from 0 to 50). However, the 
managers do not observe the true value of the second integer. Instead, they are informed 
of the interval that contains the true value of this integer. This interval includes 15 
integers and each integer in the interval has an equal chance of being the second integer’s 
actual value.28 This uncertainty resembles ambiguity in the financial reporting context, 
which allows managers’ reporting discretion. After that, the manager and the auditor, 
consequently, make decisions as summarized in previous chapter (Figure 2). 
                                                 
28 The interval is determined by randomly selecting an integer between 1 and 15. The number indicates the 
position of the undisclosed integer in the 15-integer interval. For example, if the undisclosed integer is 25 
and the position is 3, then the interval given to the manager is [23, 37]. However, the interval is bounded by 
the possible value of the undisclosed integer (0 to 50). Therefore, the interval cannot go lower than [0, 14] 
or higher than [36, 50]. 
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The aggressive manager’s payoff increases with the manager’s reported value as 
long as the reported value is accepted by the auditor. In this case, the payoff equals 1 to 
the reported value. However, if the reported value is rejected by the auditor, then his/her 
pay becomes 80 percent of the actual commodity value. The conservative manager’s 
payoff is similar to the aggressive manager’s except that if the auditor rejects the report, 
the pay reduces to only 20 percent of the actual commodity value. The auditor’s payoff 
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Once both players finish their actions, their payoffs are calculated and each player 
is privately informed of his/her payoff for the round. Participants are re-paired (each 
auditor is paired with a different manager of the same type: diligent auditor-aggressive 
manager and lax auditor-conservative manager) and the new round begins. This task is 
repeated for four rounds. The participants receive cash payment according to their 
payoffs in a randomly chosen round at the rate of 6 Liras per dollar.29 After the fourth 
round is done, a short quiz, including three true/false conceptual questions, is distributed 
to assess participants’ understanding of the incentive structure, which is considered task-
specific semantic knowledge.  The quiz measures relevant semantic knowledge and its 
score is used to ascertain that participants in each group come into the second 
experimental task with the same level of semantic knowledge. The participants are paid 4 
Liras per each correct answer in the quiz. 
 For this task, participants in the control group only read the instructions but do not 
have the opportunity to participate. After reading the instructions, participants in the 
control group complete the same quiz as do participants in the other groups. This quiz 
helps verify that before participating in the second task, participants in the control group 
have a similar amount of relevant semantic knowledge as the other groups.30 It also 
enables controlling for task-specific semantic knowledge before examining the effect of 
varying levels of episodic knowledge stored in the participants’ memory on auditor 
support.  
                                                 
29 To expedite the experiment, participants are paid once they finish all experimental tasks. In addition, they 
do not know their cash payoffs until the end of experiment. The objective of this treatment is to prevent any 
potential effect (e.g., induced positive or negative emotional states) that cash payments may have on their 
judgment in the subsequent task. 
30 The experimenter also goes through the quiz solution with the participants before they partake in the next 
task. This procedure aims to provide further assurance that the significant difference in the participants’ 
task-related semantic knowledge does not exist. 
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6.2.2 Second Task (Auditor Committee) 
After the first task is completed, every participant (in all five experimental 
groups) immediately participates in the audit committee task, which involves auditor-
manager dispute resolution. All participants assume the role of an audit committee 
member, whose task is to predict the commodity value. 
This task consists of six rounds. At the beginning of each round, participants (in 
the role of an audit committee member) receive information from a randomly selected 
disagreement when the manager reports aggressively and the auditor’s estimate is closer 
to the commodity value than the manager’s reported value.31 The audit committee 
members are informed of (1) the integer that is public knowledge, (2) the manager’s 
reported value, and (3) the auditor’s own estimate of the commodity’s value. However, 
they do not know whether the manager in the disagreement has an incentive to be 
aggressive or conservative. Then, they are asked to (1) predict the actual commodity 
value and (2) indicate agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value (from 0 to 100 percent).32 
The audit committee member’s payoff increases with the proximity of his/her 
estimate (E) to the actual commodity value (A).33 Specifically, each player receives a 
reward of 50 Liras minus the absolute prediction error (50 - |E – A|). In addition, if the 
auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s reported value is justified (the manager’s report 
contains unacceptable error to the auditor), each player receives 20 Liras time the 
                                                 
31 For convenience, the disagreements used in the task are pre-selected from a prior session of the 
experiment. Also, to prevent experimental noise, all participants receive the same set of information in each 
round of the task. 
32 I expect the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to provide more variation in judgment 
than the yes/no question used in the preliminary study. 
33 Bedard et al. (2004) indicate that unlike auditors, audit committee members do not have an asymmetric 




percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision. In contrast, if the auditor’s decision 
is invalid, each player receives 20 Liras times the percentage in disagreement with the 
auditor’s decision (100% - percentage in agreement). The task is repeated six rounds. As 
in the first task, participants are paid based on their performance in a randomly selected 
round using a conversion rate of 6 Liras per dollar. Afterwards, the experimenter, with 
the help of assistants, calculates each participant’s monetary payoff, asks them to 
complete a PEQ, and pays them in cash.  
 
6.3 Experimental Predictions 
6.3.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
 The manipulation of manager type does not change the extensive game form of 
the auditor-manager task depicted in last chapter (Figure 4). The only difference lies in 
the value of θ in the manager’s payoff function (θ = 80% and 20% for the aggressive and 
conservative managers, respectively). Although the conservative manager obtains a lower 
payoff from a rejected report than the aggressive manager, the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium prescribed in Appendix B still holds for both manager types. That is, the 
game-theoretic equilibrium suggests no difference in the aggressive and the conservative 
managers’ actions. 
 Despite the game-theoretic predictions, prior research (e.g., Goeree and Holt 
2001, Bowlin et al. 2009) documents the “own-payoff effect,” the tendency for one’s 
behavior to reflect variation in his/her own payoff even if only other players’ payoffs 
should matter in the game-theoretic equilibrium. If managers fixate on their own payoffs, 
then overstating the commodity value will seem relatively less attractive for the 
82 
 
conservative managers (due to more severe punishment when the report is rejected by the 
auditor). As a result of the own-payoff effect, I conjecture that compared to conservative 
managers, aggressive managers report more aggressively. In addition, since the reported 
value influences how the auditor forms a belief about the manager’s underlying action, I 
expect the auditor’s tendency to reject the manager’s report increases with the reported 
value. 
 
6.3.2 Second Task (Auditor Committee) 
I test the hypotheses using participants’ decisions in the second (audit committee) 
task of the experiment. I construct the experiment in a way that all participants have 
opportunity to acquire second-hand (semantic) knowledge of the incentives of both the 
auditor and the manager, so they can form an idea about individuals in each role. 
However, participants in each of the five groups are different in their levels of episodic 
knowledge, obtained from first-hand experience in the first (auditor-manager) task. I use 
two classifications in categorizing their episodic knowledge: by incentives and actions. 
First, pertaining to their incentives, I expect participants in the manager role to fixate on 
their own payoffs (particularly the penalty for detected aggressive reporting behavior). 
Therefore, those assigned to the conservative manager group are less incentivized to 
report aggressively than the aggressive manager group due to the own payoff effect. 
Hence, the two manager groups are presumed to obtain episodic knowledge from 
experience as a conservative and an aggressive manager, respectively. 
For the auditor groups, those with experience as an auditor interacting with 
aggressive managers (the diligent auditor group) are more likely to encounter an 
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aggressive reported value and thus, are more motivated to act conservatively (i.e., provide 
a low estimate and/or reject the manager’s report) than the auditor auditors. I label 
auditors interacting with aggressive managers as “diligent auditors” and those 
encountering conservative managers as “lax auditors.” Participants in the control group 
do not have direct experience as an auditor or a manager, so they do not have opportunity 
to acquire aforementioned episodic knowledge. 
The next classification is based on participants’ behavior in the auditor-manager 
task, similar to Chapter 5. Former auditors whose average commodity estimate in the 
auditor-manager task is below (above) the median value are considered diligent (lax) 
auditors. Former managers whose average reported value is below (above) the median 
value are categorized as conservative (aggressive) managers. I conduct two analyses 
based on this classification. Overall (folded across the auditor and manager types) 
medians of average commodity estimate and average reported value are used as cutoffs in 
the first analysis. Afterward, I reperform the analysis using group medians of average 
commodity estimate and average reported value as thresholds.34 
The first set of hypotheses (H1a and H1b) focus on the impact of episodic 
knowledge acquired through direct experience as an auditor on a level of auditor support 
in reconciling auditor-manager disagreements. In contrast, the second set of hypotheses 
(H2a and H2b) pertains to the effect of episodic knowledge obtained from experience as a 
manager (either aggressive or conservative type). I use two variables, SUPPORT and 
MIDDIFF, to capture the level of auditor support in a disagreement. SUPPORT equals 
the percentage agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s reported 
                                                 
34 Managers who reported more (less) aggressively than the average peer in the same group are categorized 
as aggressive (conservative) managers. Auditors whose judgment is more (less) conservative than the 
average peer in the same group are classified as diligent (lax) auditors. 
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value, while MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate and the 
middle point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. The higher 
value of SUPPORT and the lower value of MIDDIFF denote the high level of auditor 
support. According to the hypotheses, episodic knowledge from experience as an auditor 
or an aggressive manager should strengthen auditor support, while episodic knowledge 
from a conservative manager experience should not. 
 
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
Responses to the manipulation check questions suggest that all manipulations 
were successful. First, all participants correctly indicated the type of manager (aggressive 
or conservative) in their sessions. Second, although it is possible that direct experience 
allows one to acquire both higher levels of episodic and semantic knowledge, the results 
of a conceptual knowledge test provide assurance that it is very unlikely in my 
experiment. Panel A of Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics of the conceptual test 
score, measuring participants’ level of semantic knowledge regarding the incentives of 
the auditor and manager in the first task. There is no difference in the test score across 
groups (p-value = 0.423). Furthermore, Panel B of Table 9 depicts risk preference scores 
of participants in each group. Like the knowledge test score, the risk preference score 
does not differ across groups (p-value = 0.966). Therefore, my results are not driven by 




Conceptual Knowledge and Risk Preference Scores (Main Study) 
 
Panel A: Conceptual Knowledge Test Scores 
Group Mean   
Standard 
Deviation    
Control 2.80  0.41    
Diligent Auditor 2.81  0.40    
Lax Auditor 2.95  0.23    
Aggressive Manager 2.90  0.30    
Conservative Manager 2.95  0.23    
       
Prob > F  0.423      
 
Panel B: Risk Preference Scoresa 
Group Mean   
Standard 
Deviation   
Control 6.00  1.16   
Diligent Auditor 5.71  1.49   
Lax Auditor 5.83  1.54   
Aggressive Manager 5.90  1.25   
Conservative Manager 5.74  1.45   
      




a The score represents the first time a participants chose a risky alternative among two options in the task 
similar to Holt and Laury (2002). The possible range is 1 to 10. The higher score indicates greater risk-
aversion and a risk neutral participant is expected to have a score of 5. Three participants are excluded from 





6.4.2 Analysis Using Classification by Incentives 
6.4.2.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
The results of the first (auditor-manager) task are summarized in Table 10. As 
shown in Panel A, both aggressive and conservative managers tend to overstate the 
commodity value. In addition, aggressive managers report significantly higher numbers 
than their conservative counterparts. On average, the aggressive (conservative) manager’s 
reported value is 8.00 (4.87) above the actual commodity value and 7.00 (3.87) above the 
middle of possible range (the publicly known integer plus the middle value of the 15- 
integer range containing the other integer). Moreover, aggressive managers report 
significantly higher values compared to the conservative counterparts (one-sided p-values 
of reported value less the publicly known integer, reported value less actual value and 
reported value less the middle of possible range = 0.048). The results suggest that the 
manipulation of manager’s incentive succeeds as aggressive managers are induced to 











a Middle of Possible Range equals to the publicly known integer plus the middle value of the range 
containing the privately known integer. 
**, * The mean (clustered robust) difference is statistically different from zero at the 5 and 10 percent 
significance level (one-sided probability). 
 
 
Panel A: Manager’s Report 








Reported Value less Publicly Known 
Integer         32.25              29.12 **      30.76 
 
 (11.50)  (12.92)  (12.25)  
Reported Value less Actual Value            8.00                 4.87 **          6.51  
 (8.65)  (10.53)  (9.69)  
Reported Value less Middle of 
Possible Rangea            7.00                 3.87 **          5.51 
 
 (8.75)  (10.59)  (9.76)  
       
Panel B: Auditor’s Estimation and Propensity to Accept Manager’s Report 








Estimate  less Publicly Known Integer     27.13              25.01 *      26.13  
 (9.58)  (10.90)  (10.25)  
Estimate less Manager’s Reported Value      -5.12              -4.11       - 4.64  
 (11.06)  (11.33)  (11.17)  
Estimate less Actual Value       2.88               0.76 *        1.88  
 (9.24)  (9.67)  (9.48)  
Acceptance of Manager’s Report       
    Overall 67.86%  73.68%  70.63%  
    When Manager’s Reported Value 




Auditors tend to discount the manager’s reported value, as reported in Panel B. 
The average estimate of the auditor facing aggressive (conservative) manager is 5.12 
(4.11) less than the aggressive (conservative) manager’s reported value. However, the 
auditor’s adjustment does not totally remove the manager’s bias since the average 
auditor’s estimate is 2.88 (0.76) above the actual value when the manager is aggressive 
(conservative) type. About 68% (74%) of the aggressive (conservative) manager’s reports 
are accepted by the auditor. Auditors encountering aggressive managers (“diligent” 
auditors) made significantly lower estimates than “lax” auditors (one-sided p-values of 
estimate less the publicly known integer and estimate less actual value = 0.082). 
Nonetheless, the two groups’ discount placed on and tendency to accept the manager’s 
report are not statistically significant (one-sided p-values = 0.162 and 0.238). Figure 7 
delineates that the auditor’s acceptance rate generally decreases with the manager’s 
reported value. In addition, on average, the magnitude of the auditor’s discount does not 
relate to the type of manager they are interacting with. All in all, the first task is 
successful in allowing participants to gain experience in the commodity valuation task in 
which specific incentives are used to simulate an auditor-manager interaction.35 
                                                 
35 In the auditor-manager task, the average difference between the manager’s reported value and the 
auditor’s estimate when the auditor rejects the manager’s report is 10.30 with the standard deviation of 
12.44. In the selected cases used in the audit committee member task, managers’ reported values exceed 
auditors’ estimate by 9.40 on average, ranging from 7 to 13. Therefore, the selected cases of auditor-











Reported Values less Public Signal 
 
Figure 7 





6.4.2.2 Second Task (Audit Committee) 
I code four dummy variables, corresponding to the five experimental groups, in 
this study. First, AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge as an 
auditor encountering aggressive managers (the diligent auditor group), or 0 otherwise. 
Second, AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge as an auditor 
encountering conservative managers (the lax auditor group), or 0 otherwise. Next, 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge as an aggressive manager 
(the aggressive manager group), or 0 otherwise. Lastly, ManagerCon equals 1 if the 
participant has episodic knowledge as a conservative manager (the conservative manager 
group), or 0 otherwise. 
 I run two regression models as shown in Table 11 to test my hypotheses. The first 
regression (Panel A) is a linear model that regresses SUPPORT on four dummy variables, 
AuditorDil, AuditorLax, ManagerAgr and ManagerCon.  The second regression (Panel 




Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II (Main Study) 
 
Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ ++++=  
       
Independent  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Standard 
 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  29.067  3.725  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 15.140  4.859  0.002 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 10.600  5.170  0.043 ** 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 18.624  5.508  0.001 *** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 4.977  6.122  0.418  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.342  
        
Prob > F  0.006 ***     
R2 0.057      
 
Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 43210 βββββ ++++=  
       
Independent  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient 
Standard 
 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  1.192  0.817  0.058 ** 
AuditorDil - (H1a) -2.676  0.956  0.006 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -1.920  0.758  0.013 *** 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -2.231  0.717  0.002 *** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -0.183  0.817  0.823  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.374  
        
Prob > F  0.001 ***     
R2 0.024      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge of the diligent auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge of the lax auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
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ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge of the aggressive manager, or 0 
otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge of the conservative manager, or 0 
otherwise. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 
c Two-sided probability. 
 
 
H1a predicts that participants who have episodic knowledge from experience as a 
diligent or lax auditor will provide more auditor support, compared to those in the control 
group. As a result, I expect the coefficients of AuditorDil and AuditorLax to be positive 
for the first regression (SUPPORT) but negative for the second regression (MIDDIFF). 
According to Panel A of Table 11, episodic knowledge as a diligent and a lax auditor 
increases the participant’s likelihood to side with the auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.001 
and 0.022). In addition, Panel B shows that on average, the estimates of participants with 
episodic knowledge as a diligent and a lax auditor are closer to the auditor’s estimate than 
the control group (one-sided p-values = 0.003 and 0.007). I test H1b, which predicts that 
episodic knowledge as a diligent auditor results in greater auditor support than the 
knowledge as a lax auditor, by comparing coefficients of AuditorDil and AuditorLax in 
both regressions. Using t-tests, I do not find any statistically significant difference (one-
sided p-values = 0.171 and 0.187). Overall, the results, based on the classification by 
incentives, provide support for H1a but not H1b. 
Next, I test H2a and H2b by examining the coefficients of ManagerAgg and 
ManagerCon, respectively. The hypotheses project that the level of auditor support of 
participants in the aggressive (conservative) manager group is more than (indifferent 
from) that of the control group. Thus, I expect the coefficient of ManagerAgg 
(ManagerCon) to be positive (zero) for the first regression but negative (zero) for the 
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second regression. According to Panels A and B of Table 11, episodic knowledge as an 
aggressive manager significantly increases participants’ propensity to side with the 
auditor (one-sided p-value = 0.001) and makes the participants’ estimates significantly 
closer to the auditor’s estimate (one-sided p-value = 0.001). In contrast, episodic 
knowledge obtained from the role of a conservative manager does not significantly affect 
the percentage agreement with the auditor (p-value = 0.418) nor sway the participant’s 
estimates toward the auditor’s side (p-value = 0.823). Taken the results together, I 
conclude that episodic knowledge obtained from experience as a manager enhances 
auditor support during an auditor-manager conflict resolution only if he/she has 
previously been an aggressive manager. 
 
6.4.3 Analysis Using Classification by Actions 
 I conduct additional analyses using the classification based on participants’ 
behavior in the first (auditor-manager) task. First, I use the overall median average 
estimate (after taking out the publicly known integer) in the first task to split the auditor 
group (including both diligent and lax auditors) into diligent (below the median) and lax 
(above the median) auditors. I also reclassify managers using the overall median average 
reported value (after taking out the publicly known integer). Those whose average 
reported value is above (below) the median is considered aggressive (conservative). 
Then, I test my hypotheses in a similar way as in the previous section. The only 
difference is that I use the classification based on participants’ actions, instead of their 
incentives. Lastly, I repeat the above the processes but using the group median average 
estimates and the group median average reported values in the first task for classifications 
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of auditors and managers. The auditor whose average reported value is below (above) the 
group median is classified as a diligent (lax) auditor. The manager whose average 
reported value is above (below) the group median is considered an aggressive 
(conservative) manager. 
 
6.4.3.1 First Task (Auditor-Manager) 
Table 12 delineates the results of the first (auditor-manager) task after the overall-
median and the group-median splits. Panel A shows that as expected, both splits result in 
significant differences in managers’ behavior. Aggressive managers’ reported values are 
significantly higher than those of conservative managers (all one-sided p-values = 0.000). 
Panel B depicts that both splits also lead to significant differences in auditors’ behavior. 
Diligent auditors’ estimates are significantly lower than those of lax auditors (one-sided 
p-values of estimate less the publicly known integer and estimate less actual value for 
both splits = 0.000). In addition, diligent auditors tend to discount the manager’s report to 
a larger extent than lax auditors (one-sided p-value = 0.003 for the overall-median split 
and 0.007 for the group-median split). Therefore, both categorizations are successful in 










a Middle of Possible Range equals to the publicly known integer plus the middle value of the range 
containing the privately known integer. 
*** The mean (clustered robust) difference is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent significance 
level (two-sided probability). 
       
       
Panel A: Manager’s Report 
     










Reported Value less 
Publicly Known Integer) 34.15 26.74 *** 34.04 27.50 *** 
 (10.89) (11.12)  (11.32) (11.01)  
Reported Value less 
Actual Value 
9.90 2.49 *** 9.79 3.25 *** 
(8.27) (8.03)  (8.52) (8.20)  
Reported Value less 
Middle of Possible 
Rangea 
8.90 1.49 *** 8.79 2.25 *** 
(8.56) (7.83) 
 
(8.78) (8.07)  
    
Panel B: Auditor’s Estimation and Propensity to Accept Manager’s Report 
     










Estimate less Publicly 
Known Integer 23.34 29.16 *** 23.61 29.47 *** 
 (8.81) (10.12)  (8.83) (10.24)  
Estimate less Manager’s 
Reported Value 
-6.09 -2.30 *** -5.78 -2.25 *** 
(11.13) (8.62)  (10.70) (9.02)  
Estimate less Actual 
Value 
-0.91 4.91 *** -0.64 5.22 *** 
 (8.47) (9.13)  (8.38) (9.30)  
Acceptance of 
Manager’s Report 
      
    Overall 72.50% 68.80%  71.60% 69.40%  
 (44.90%) (46.60%)  (45.40%) (46.40%)  
    When Manager’s 
Reported Value >   
Actual Value 
67.90% 68.20%  66.10% 70.00%  
(47.10%) (46.90%) 
 
(44.70%) (46.20%)  
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6.4.3.2 Second Task (Audit Committee) 
I code four dummy variables, corresponding to the classification by participants’ 
actions in the auditor-manager task (first, using the overall median and second, using the 
group medians). First, AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge as a 
diligent auditor, or 0 otherwise. Second, AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has 
episodic knowledge as a lax auditor, or 0 otherwise. Next, ManagerAgg equals 1 if the 
participant has episodic knowledge as an aggressive manager, or 0 otherwise. Lastly, 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge as a conservative 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
 For each type of median split, I run two regression models, similar to the original 
grouping (based on incentives), to test my hypotheses. Table 13 depicts the results after 
the overall-median split, while Table 14 delineates the results after the group-median 
split. The first regression in each table (Panel A) is a linear model that regresses 
SUPPORT on four dummy variables, AuditorDil, AuditorLax, ManagerAgr and 
ManagerCon.  The second regression in each table (Panel B) is a linear model that 








Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ ++++=  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  29.067  3.725  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 16.317  4.782  0.001 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 9.650  5.158  0.064 ** 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 19.758  5.895  0.001 *** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 4.525  5.592  0.420  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.156 * 
        
Prob > F  0.002 ***     
R2 0.066      
 
Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 







 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  1.192  0.622  0.058 * 
AuditorDil - (H1a) -3.225  0.957  0.001 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -1.408  0.735  0.058 ** 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -1.933  0.736  0.010 *** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -0.583  0.827  0.483  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.030 ** 
        
Prob > F  0.006 ***     
R2 0.025      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent 
auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
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AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor, 
or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
conservative manager, or 0 otherwise. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 










Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ ++++=  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  29.067  3.725  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 16.698  4.627  0.000 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 8.443  5.358  0.118 * 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 21.017  6.237  0.001 *** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 4.880  5.311  0.360  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.084 ** 
        
Prob > F  0.001 ***     
R2 0.072      
 
Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledgea 
ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 43210 βββββ ++++=  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  1.192  0.622  0.058 * 
AuditorDil - (H1a) -3.169  0.908  0.001 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -1.275  0.752  0.093 ** 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -1.840  0.797  0.023 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -0.783  0.781  0.319  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.018 *** 
        
Prob > F  0.008 ***     
R2 0.024      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
100 
 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent 
auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor, 
or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
conservative manager, or 0 otherwise. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 
c Two-sided probability. 
 
Because the overall-median and group-median splits lead to the same conclusion, 
I discuss the results of both categorizations simultaneously.36 H1a predicts that 
participants that have episodic knowledge from direct experience as a diligent or lax 
auditor provide more auditor support, compared to those in the control group. Therefore, 
I expect the coefficients of AuditorDil and AuditorLax to be positive for the first 
regression (SUPPORT) but negative for the second regression (MIDDIFF). According to 
Tables 13 and 14, episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent auditor 
increases tendency to side with the auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.001 and 0.000) and 
make a conservative estimate (one-sided p-values = 0.001 and 0.001). Episodic 
knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor also raises likelihood to side with the 
auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.032 and 0.059) and estimate a commodity value more 
conservatively (one-sided p-values = 0.029 and 0.047).   
H1b predicts that episodic knowledge from direct experience as a diligent auditor 
results in greater auditor support than the knowledge from direct experience as a lax 
auditor. Hence, I compare the coefficients of AuditorDil and AuditorLax in all 
regressions. Using t-tests, I find that episodic knowledge as a diligent auditor enhances 
auditor support to a greater extent than the knowledge as a lax auditor (one-sided p-
                                                 




values = 0.078 and 0.042 for SUPPORT Model and 0.015 and 0.009 for MIDDIFF 
Model). Hence, I conclude that episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an 
auditor, especially a diligent one, makes participants more likely to support the auditor in 
the audit committee task. It is also notable while the effects of the two types of episodic 
knowledge are not significantly different from each other in the preliminary study and the 
main study using the classification by incentives, the classification by actions in the main 
study can capture the significant difference between the two types of episodic knowledge. 
For the preliminary study, a possible explanation is that the manager knows the true value 
with certainty, so the variation in auditors’ judgments does not provide sufficient power 
to detect the difference. The failure to detect the difference between episodic knowledge 
as a diligent and a lax auditor in the main study when the classification based on 
incentives is used signals the importance of physical aspects in an encoded episode. 
Enactment and actions should be an integral part of episodic knowledge as an auditor and 
provide an incremental value over the psychological elements of episodic knowledge. 
Next, I test H2a and H2b by examining the coefficients of ManagerAgg and 
ManagerCon, respectively. The hypotheses prescribe that the level of auditor support of 
participants in the aggressive (conservative) manager group is more than (not different 
from) that of the control group. Hence, I expect the coefficient of ManagerAgg 
(ManagerCon) to be positive (zero) for the first regression but negative (zero) for the 
second regression. According to Panel A of Tables 13 and 14, episodic knowledge as an 
aggressive manager significantly increases participants’ propensity to side with the 
auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.001 and 0.001) and sways the participants’ estimates 
closer to the auditor’s estimate (one-sided p-values = 0.005 and 0.012). In contrast, 
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episodic knowledge as a conservative manager does not significantly affect the 
percentage agreement with the auditor (one-sided p-values = 0.210 and 0.180) nor move 
the participant’s estimates closer to the auditor’s (one-sided p-value = 0.242 and 0.160). 
In summary, episodic knowledge obtained from experience as a manager enhances 
auditor support during an auditor-manager conflict resolution only if he/she has 
previously been an aggressive manager. 
 
6.4.4 Robustness Check 
 Although I use the experimental method to ensure high internal validity, the fact 
that episodic knowledge is not directly observable may cast some doubt whether the 
documented variation among the participant groups are caused by the different levels of 
episodic knowledge. Hence, I run additional analyses to check the robustness of the 
experimental results after controlling for other factors that might affect the participants’ 
judgments and decisions in the audit committee task. 
 First, I control for the possible confounding effect of group classification, which 
leads to favoritism of the in-group over the out-group (Tajfel et al. 1971). For example, 
the participants designated as an auditor in the auditor-manager task might choose to side 
with the auditor in the audit committee task just because they categorize the auditor as 
one of “us” but the manager as one of “them.” To control for the possible effect of 
intergroup differentiation, I add a dummy variable AuditorClassification, which equals 1 
for the participant designated as an auditor in the auditor-manager task or 0 otherwise.37 
                                                 
37 Although participants in the control group did not make any decision in the auditor-manager task, they 
were still randomly designated as an auditor, an aggressive manager, or a conservative manager. 
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 Next, I control for the participants’ risk attitudes and levels of semantic 
knowledge. Although I do not find a significant difference in risk attitudes and semantic 
knowledge across experimental groups, their decisions in the audit committee task might 
have been affected by these two attributes.38 I, thus, include ConceptKnow and 
RiskAverse as covariates. ConceptKnow is a proxy for the level of task-relevant semantic 
knowledge (before entering the audit committee task), which equals the participant’s 
score on the conceptual knowledge test. RiskAverse is a proxy for risk aversion, based on 
a measure adapted from Holt and Laury (2002).39 
 Lastly, I control for the possible effect of frequency knowledge that participants 
in the auditor and the manager groups may have over those in the control group. In 
addition to episodic knowledge, frequency knowledge (i.e., the probabilities of given 
events occurring and co-occurring) may be accumulated through experience (Baddeley 
1993). Direct experience in the auditor-manager task may increase frequency knowledge 
about the behavior of an auditor and a manager, which, in turn, possibly affects the 
degree of auditor support. Hence, I include AggFreq and TooConFreq, proxies for 
differential frequency knowledge comparative to the control group, as covariates.40 
AggFreq is coded as the number of times the participant personally experienced an 
aggressive report by the manager (i.e., a report containing an unacceptable error from the 
auditor’s perspective) in auditor-manager interactions. In contrast, TooConFreq is coded 
as the number of times the participant personally experienced an incorrect rejection by 
the auditor (i.e., the auditor rejects the manager’s report containing an acceptable error). 
                                                 
38 I do not make explicit predictions on how these attributes might influence the participants’ levels of 
auditor support. While the auditor is induced to be more objective, the manager actually has more 
information on the commodity value. 
39 A higher score depicts a higher degree of risk aversion. 
40 The participants in the control group are assigned AggFreq and TooConFreq of 0. 
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For robustness check, I add the above control variables to each regression model 








Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ  
                       
ii iateCo varβ  






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
        
Intercept  66.568  16.548  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 17.943  7.524  0.019 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 15.680  7.730  0.045 ** 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 11.870  6.869  0.087 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 0.858  6.745  0.899  
AuditorClassification  -8.572  7.112  0.231  
ConceptKnow  -10.830  4.581  0.020 ** 
RiskAverse  -0.441  1.159  0.704  
AggFreq  -0.097  2.043  0.962  
TooConFreq  2.025  2.384  0.398  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.615  
        
Prob > F  0.006 ***     











Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 43210 βββββ  
                       
ii iateCo varβ        






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
        
Intercept  -2.987  3.865  0.442  
AuditorDil - (H1a) -2.759  0.923  0.004 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -2.125  0.791  0.009 *** 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -2.640  1.131  0.022 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -0.796  1.216  0.514  
AuditorClassification  -0.409  1.069  0.703  
ConceptKnow  1.726  1.213  0.158  
RiskAverse  -0.128  0.162  0.433  
AggFreq  0.281  0.217  0.199  
TooConFreq  0.244  0.372  0.513  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.400  
        
Prob > F  0.013 **     
R2 0.028      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent 
auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor, 
or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
conservative manager, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorClassfication equals 1 if the participant is designated as an auditor in the auditor-manager task. 
ConceptKnow is the score on conceptual task-knowledge test. 
RiskAverse indicates a degree of risk aversion. 
AggFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the manager’s aggressive reporting in the auditor-
manager task. 
TooConFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the auditor’s overly conservative judgment in 
the auditor-manager task. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 




Robustness Check - Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II after 
Overall-Median Split (Main Study) 
 
 
Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ  
                       
ii iateCo varβ        






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  65.090  16.307  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 21.784  7.392  0.004 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 15.354  7.948  0.056 ** 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 15.399  7.493  0.043 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 0.725  6.379  0.910  
AuditorClassification  -8.678  7.111  0.225  
ConceptKnow  -10.726  4.487  0.019 ** 
RiskAverse  -0.235  1.135  0.836  
AggFreq  -1.475  2.146  0.494  
TooConFreq  2.397  2.171  0.272  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.145 * 
        
Prob > F  0.002 ***     




















Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 43210 βββββ  
                       







 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  -2.839  3.683  0.443  
AuditorDil - (H1a) -3.320  0.959  0.001 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -1.658  0.835  0.050 ** 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -2.446  1.205  0.045 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -1.050  1.197  0.383  
AuditorClassification  -0.398  1.068  0.710  
ConceptKnow  1.722  1.124  0.129  
RiskAverse  -0.151  0.165  0.362  
AggFreq  0.316  0.244  0.200  
TooConFreq  0.161  0.353  0.648  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.034 ** 
        
Prob > F  0.026 **     
R2 0.030      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent 
auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor, 
or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
conservative manager, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorClassfication equals 1 if the participant is designated as an auditor in the auditor-manager task. 
ConceptKnow is the score on conceptual task-knowledge test. 
RiskAverse indicates a degree of risk aversion. 
AggFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the manager’s aggressive reporting in the auditor-
manager task. 
TooConFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the auditor’s overly conservative judgment in 
the auditor-manager task. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 





Robustness Check - Regression Models for Auditor Support in Task II after 
Group-Median Split (Main Study) 
 
 
Panel A: Linear Model of Regressive SUPPORT on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilSUPPORT 43210 βββββ  
                       
ii iateCo varβ        






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  64.748  16.044  0.000 *** 
AuditorDil + (H1a) 20.739  7.241  0.005 *** 
AuditorLax + (H1a) 12.929  7.943  0.107 * 
ManagerAgg + (H2a) 14.938  7.501  0.049 ** 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) 0.088  6.481  0.989  
AuditorClassification  -8.701  7.118  0.225  
ConceptKnow  -10.404  4.653  0.028 ** 
RiskAverse  -0.326  1.125  0.773  
AggFreq  -0.689  2.007  0.732  
TooConFreq  2.912  2.220  0.193  
21 ββ −  + (H1b)     0.090 ** 
        
Prob > F  0.001 ***     




















Panel B: Linear Model of Regressive MIDDIFF on Types of Episodic Knowledge 
and Covariatesa 
+++++= ManagerConManagerAggAuditorLaxAuditorDilMIDDIFF 43210 βββββ  
                       
ii iateCo varβ        






 Errorsb Probabilityc 
 
Intercept  -2.786  3.700  0.453  
AuditorDil - (H1a) -3.166  0.928  0.001 *** 
AuditorLax - (H1a) -1.253  0.844  0.141 * 
ManagerAgg - (H2a) -1.961  1.305  0.136 * 
ManagerCon 0 (H2b) -1.239  1.163  0.290  
AuditorClassification  -0.394  1.069  0.713  
ConceptKnow  1.746  1.153  0.133  
RiskAverse  -0.171  0.152  0.264  
AggFreq  0.150  0.239  0.533  
TooConFreq  0.184  0.352  0.602  
21 ββ −  - (H1b)     0.013 *** 
        
Prob > F  0.046 **     
R2 0.029      
 
 
a Variable definitions: 
SUPPORT indicates the percentage in agreement with the auditor’s decision to reject the manager’s 
reported value. 
MIDDIFF is the difference between the participant’s estimate of commodity value and the middle 
point between the manager’s reported value and the auditor’s estimate. 
AuditorDil equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a diligent 
auditor, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorLax equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a lax auditor, 
or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerAgg equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as an aggressive 
manager, or 0 otherwise. 
ManagerCon equals 1 if the participant has episodic knowledge from prior experience as a 
conservative manager, or 0 otherwise. 
AuditorClassfication equals 1 if the participant is designated as an auditor in the auditor-manager task. 
ConceptKnow is the score on conceptual task-knowledge test. 
RiskAverse indicates a degree of risk aversion. 
AggFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the manager’s aggressive reporting in the auditor-
manager task. 
TooConFreq is the number of first-hand encounters with the auditor’s overly conservative judgment in 
the auditor-manager task. 
b Clustered robust standard error is used to control for within-subject error (clustered variable = subject ID). 




6.4.5 Post Experiment Questionnaire (PEQ) Data Analysis 
The PEQ data show that all participants understand their role in the experiment 
and that they can remember the type of manager (aggressive or conservative) involved in 
their session of the auditor-manager task. The data also indicate no statistical difference 
in gender and education among the participants. 
I include a series of questions (Appendix E) to shed more light into the processes 
underlying participants’ judgment in the audit committee task. I focus on the questions 
pertaining to direct experience and episodic knowledge as an auditor or a manager. 
Questions 13 to 15 ask participants to evaluate the benefit of prior experience in the role 
of an auditor, an aggressive manager, and a conservative manager on their performance 
in the audit committee task. In addition, Questions 22 to 24 measure the degree to which 
each participant considers the perspectives of an auditor, an aggressive manager, and a 
conservative manager before making decisions in the audit committee task. All responses 
are in the form of 11-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much). 
Panel A of Table 18 shows the average scores by group (using the original groups, after 
the overall-median split, and after the group-median split). I report p-values from the 




Post-Experiment Questionnaire Analysis (Main Study) 
 
Panel A: Average Scores by (1) Original Groups, (2) After Overall-Median Split and 
 (3) After Group-Median Split  














       
Benefit of Prior 
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Benefit of Prior 
Experience as a (an):      
Auditor  0.086 * 0.128  0.124 
Aggressive Manager 0.344  0.877  0.569 
Conservative Manager 0.211  0.028 ** 0.016 ** 
       
Extent to which One 
Considers Perspective 
of:      
Auditor 0.230  0.276  0.337 
Aggressive Manager 0.011 ** 0.063 * 0.349 





 I expect participants who have prior experience as an auditor or a manager to 
value such experience and utilize it in the audit committee task. Using the original group 
classification, on average, participants in the auditor role value the auditor experience 
more than the others. I perform post-hoc tests using Tukey method and find that the 
auditor encountering conservative manager (lax auditor) group appreciates the auditor 
experience more than the conservative manager group (p-value = 0.079). Although the 
aggressive manager group has the highest average score on the importance of the 
aggressive manager experience, I do not find any significant difference among groups, 
possibly due to the small sample size. Lastly, the conservative manager group cherishes 
the conservative manager experience the most, while the diligent auditor group does not 
think highly of such experience. The post-hoc tests after both overall-median and group-
median splits reveal that the diligent auditor group rates the importance of the 
conservative manager experience significantly lower than the conservative manager (p-
values = 0.043 and 0.019), lax auditor (p-values = 0.051 and 0.115), and control groups 
(p-values = 0.071 and 0.091). 
 I conjecture that the episodic knowledge should enhance perspective taking ability 
when reconciling an auditor-manager disagreement. Naturally, prior experience in a 
particular role should invoke one to consider the problem from the perspective in such 
role. On average, the auditor (both diligent and lax) group takes into account the auditor’s 
perspective more than the others, while the conservative group does the same for the 
conservative manager’s perspective. However, the between-group comparison does not 
indicate any significant difference among groups. Contrary to my conjecture, the diligent 
auditor group, not the aggressive manager group, considers the aggressive manager’s 
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perspective more than the rest. The post-hoc tests denote that the diligent auditor group 
considers the aggressive manager’s perspective to the larger extent than the conservative 
manager group based on the original classification and the overall-median split (p-values 
= 0.008 and 0.087). 
 The overall results suggest that participants tend to value their prior experience, 
which in turn increases the likelihood to utilize such experience in the audit committee 
task. In addition, they seem to transcend their perspective from the auditor-manager task 
into the audit committee task. This is consistent with my expectation that episodic 
knowledge obtained from prior experience is retrieved and it allows participants to re-
experience past encounters before anticipating future outcomes. The finding that the 
diligent auditor group is the most sensitive to the aggressive manager’s perspective does 
not contradict to the notion of episodic knowledge. Episodic knowledge from the auditor 
role should lead one to understand how it feels to be in the auditor’s shoes. In particular, 
auditors, especially the relatively more diligent ones, have to be vigilant about the 
manager’s incentive to report aggressively in their interactions with managers. Also, the 
difference in audit committee judgment of the diligent and lax auditor groups may result 
from more sensitivity to the manager’s incentive to report aggressively. However, the 
difference in audit committee judgment between the aggressive and conservative 
manager groups likely result from the egocentric bias which leads them to think that the 





SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
I use laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of episodic knowledge 
acquired from previous experience as an auditor or a manager on individuals’ judgment 
in reconciling auditor-manager disagreements. When there is a conflict between the 
auditor and the manager, episodic knowledge as an auditor, especially a diligent one, can 
improve audit committee members’ propensity to support the auditor. Meanwhile, 
episodic knowledge of a manager only increases the level of auditor support when the 
manager has experience of having been an aggressive manager. This is akin to companies 
hiring white-collar criminals to prevent wrongdoing in the future or organizations hiring 
former drug-addicts as an addiction recovery coach. These people can take perspectives 
of the criminal or the addict accurately, so they can anticipate actions of the criminal or 
the addict and act accordingly. 
This paper contributes to accounting literature and practice in several ways. First, 
the results of my experiments provide an additional explanation to the findings that 
financial experts qualified by different definitions (e.g., accounting vs. non-accounting) 
may diversely affect the firm’s financial reporting. That is, their levels of relevant 
episodic knowledge differ. My results suggest that episodic knowledge from direct 
experience as an auditor benefits audit committee members’ judgment in resolving 
auditor-manager conflicts. Appointing accounting financial experts may be justified due 
to the potential benefit of the experts’ superior episodic knowledge, in addition to their 
semantic knowledge. Furthermore, the original definition of financial expertise, which 
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requires direct accounting work experience, could be favorable because it ensures a 
higher level of accounting-related episodic knowledge. My results suggest that episodic 
knowledge as a manager can also improve the audit committee’s task performance. 
However, the benefit may be limited only to those who previously reported aggressively. 
Practitioners can incorporate these findings for effective training and selection of audit 
committee members. 
Despite possible important implications to the definition of financial expertise, 
my results are subject to some caveats and generalizations should be drawn with caution. 
First, my paper only focuses on episodic knowledge pertaining to strategic interactions 
between the auditor and the manager (e.g., see Bowlin et al. 2009) but abstracts away 
other important conceptual knowledge (e.g., technical knowledge on accounting, auditing 
and management). Second, although the experimental design allows me to examine the 
impact of episodic knowledge obtained from experience as an auditor and a manager 
separately,41 the results can be sensitive to the protocol used in the experiment. In this 
experiment, participants are provided limited information and there is considerable 
randomness that determines their task performance. The influence of episodic knowledge 
on individuals’ judgment could differ in a setting involving more information and less 
uncertainty. 
 It is improper to conclude from the analyses that episodic knowledge from prior 
experience as an aggressive manager can be a substitute for episodic knowledge from 
direct experience as an auditor. Although their effects seem comparable, episodic 
knowledge as an auditor may have a significant incremental value beyond that offered by 
                                                 
41 “Accounting financial experts” can have work experience in both accounting and management positions. 
Hence, it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of the auditor’s perspective and the manager’s 
perspective using archival data. 
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episodic knowledge as an aggressive manager. One possible way to investigate this 
question is to compare task performance of individuals who possess both kinds of 
knowledge and the performance of those who only have one kind of episodic knowledge. 
I leave this issue for future study. 
Future research can disentangle the different components of episodic knowledge 
obtained from direct experience as an auditor or a manager. Using classifications by 
incentives and actions to categorize auditors and managers, I find that past actions and 
mental states associated with the recalled episodes can be the key facets of episodic 
knowledge that contribute to the experimental results. Elements in episodic knowledge 
can be differently important and possibly interact with one another, and, hence, warrant 
future research. Episodic knowledge may also interact with semantic knowledge in 
certain tasks. Future research can also explore conditions that boost or mitigate the 




EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (PRELIMINARY STUDY) 
 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment, you will have the opportunity to 
accumulate money in Liras, an experimental currency, performing two simple tasks. At 
the end of the experiment, your Liras obtained from the two tasks will be tallied and you 
will be paid $1 for every 5 Liras earned. Your on-time arrival fee and money converted 
from the accumulated Liras will be paid to you privately in cash at the end of the 
experiment. During the experiment, please do not talk, exclaim, or communicate with 
other participants. If you have any question, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will assist you. 
 
During the experiment, you will be identified only by a participant number, which will be 
given to you later. All decisions you make in the experiment will be anonymous, and no 





You will take the role of Sender or Receiver. Your role will be announced after the 
instructions are completed. The task is repeated for four rounds and your role will be the 
same in each round. You will be paired with a person in the other role. You will be paired 
with a different person in each round. You will not be told who these people are either 
during or after the experiment. 
 
In this task, there is a commodity of which actual value is determined in Lira.  
 
The Actual Commodity Value 
• The actual commodity value is the sum of two numbers randomly generated from a 
specified range of integers. We will call these two numbers Integer I and Integer II. 
Each number will be generated from integers ranging from 0 to 50. The midpoint of 
the range is 25. All the integers within that range (i.e. 0, 1, 2, …, 48, 49, 50) are 
equally likely to be chosen.  
• The actual commodity value (the sum of Integer I and Integer II) can take any integer 
value from 0 to 100 Liras. 
• The actual commodity value will be determined at the beginning of each round. So 
the actual commodity value changes in each round. 
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The Role of Sender 
 
Sender will give advice to the Receiver regarding how to estimate the commodity value. 
The Sender will submit the reported value to the Receiver using a communication sheet 
(as shown on page 125). 
 
Game Rules 
• The Sender will be informed of Integer I, Integer II and the actual commodity value 
(the sum of Integer I and Integer II). 
• The Sender can report any value from 0 to 100. The Sender’s reported value will be 
passed to the Receiver. The Receiver may either accept or reject the Sender’s reported 
value. 
• At the end of each round, the Sender will be informed of the Liras accumulated in 
that round via a feedback sheet (as shown on page 126). 
 
Payoff (Liras) 







1. If the Receiver accepts the Sender’s reported value, the Sender will receive 
money (in Lira) equal to the reported value, irrespective of the actual commodity 
value.  
 
2. If the Receiver does not accept the Sender’s reported value, the Sender will 
receive money (in Lira) equal to 60% of the actual commodity value. 
 
Example 
Suppose the actual commodity value is 60 Liras and the Sender’s reported value of the 
commodity is 68 Liras. 
 
1. If the Sender’s reported value is accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for the 
round is 68 Liras. 
2. If the Sender’s reported value is not accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for 
the round is 60% * 60 = 36 Liras. 
Receiver’s Acceptance 
of the Reported Value 
The Reported Value 





The Role of Receiver 
 
The role of Receiver is to estimate the commodity value in Lira. 
 
Game Rules 
• The Receiver will be informed of Integer I but Integer II remains unknown to the 
Receiver. 
• The Receiver will get a communication sheet from the Sender (as shown on page 
125), who knows the actual value of the commodity but is free to report any value 
from 0 to 100, regardless of the actual commodity value. The communication sheet 
will contain the Sender’s reported value. 
• After receiving the communication sheet, the Receiver makes two decisions: 
(1) The Receiver will record his/her own estimate of the commodity value. This 
estimate will be used to calculate bonus points, which are not revealed to the 
Receiver. The closer the estimate is to the actual commodity value, the more 
bonus points the Receiver will earn for the round. 
(2) The Receiver chooses whether to accept the Sender’s reported value or not. This 
decision will determine the Receiver’s final estimate of commodity value. If the 
Receiver accepts the Sender’s reported value, the reported value will be used as 
the Receiver’s final estimate. If the Receiver does not accept the Sender’s 
reported value, the Receiver’s own estimate will be used as the final estimate. 
• At the end of each round, the Receiver will be informed of the points accumulated in 
that round (excluding the bonus) via a feedback sheet (as shown on page 127). 
 
Payoff (Liras) 
• Estimation Error (E) = Final Estimate – Actual Commodity Value 









• Bonus = (100 - | Receiver’s Own Estimate – Actual Commodity Value|)/10. 
Receiver’s Acceptance 
of the Sender’s 
Reported Value 
-15 ≤ E ≤ 10 
-15 ≤ E ≤ 10 
10 + Bonus 
40 + Bonus 











Suppose Integer I is 25 and the Sender’s reported value is 68 Liras. The Receiver records 
his or her own estimate of 50 Liras. Then the Receiver rejects the Sender’s reported value 
so the Receiver’s own estimate of 50 Liras becomes the final estimate. 
 
1. If the commodity’s actual value is 60 Liras, the Receiver’s estimate error (E) is 50 - 
60 = -10.  Because E  falls within the range of [-15, 10],, the Receiver’s payoff for the 
round is 40 Liras plus the bonus . 
 
2. The bonus is computed as (100 - |50-60|)/10 = 9 Liras.  
 




Assume the same set of information from Example 1, except that the commodity’s actual 
value is 35 Liras. 
 
1. Now the Receiver’s estimate error (E) is 50 - 35 = 15.  Because E  falls outside the 
range of [-15, 10], the Receiver’s payoff for the round is 0 Lira plus the bonus. 
 
2. The bonus is computed as (100 - |50-35|)/10 = 8.5 Liras.  
 




Determination of Your Role 
 
Now, please take one of the cards that the experimenter is passing out. On the card, the 
letter (R or S) indicates which player (Receiver or Sender) you will be in this task, and 
the number is your participant number. Please keep the card only to yourself. Do not 





(1) Form Distribution 
1.1 Sender will be given a communication sheet, a feedback sheet and an 
envelope. 
1.2 Receiver will be given a feedback sheet and an envelope. 
 
(2) Information Distribution 
 2.1 The Sender will be informed of Integer I, Integer II, and the actual 
commodity value (the sum of Integer I and Integer II). 
 2.2 The Receiver will be informed of Integer I. 
 
(3) Sender’s Actions 
3.1 The Sender has 30 seconds to indicate reported value on the top section of 
the communication sheet. The reported value may be any integer from 0 to 
100. 
3.2 When you finish, please put your communication sheet and feedback sheet 
in the envelope and raise your hand. The experimenter will collect the 
envelope from you. 
 
(4) Receiver’s Actions 
4.1 The Receiver will be given a communication sheet. The top section of the 
communication sheet contains the Sender’s reported value for the round, and 
the bottom section is for the Receiver’s decisions. You will have 30 seconds 
to answer two questions. 
4.2 Think about your own estimate of the commodity value and fill in the 
bottom of the communication sheet. Your estimate may be any integer from 
0 to 100. 
4.3 Check (a) if you want to accept the Sender’s reported value and use it as the 
final estimate, or (b) if you reject the reported value and want to use your 
own estimate as the final estimate. 
4.4 When you finish, please put your communication sheet in the envelope and 
raise your hand. The experimenter will collect the envelope from you. 
 
(5) Feedback 
5.1 All envelopes will be given to an assistant, who has minimal knowledge of 
the experiment. The assistant will calculate your payoff for the round, 
complete your feedback sheet, and put your feedback sheet back in the 
envelope. However, Receiver’s bonus points will not be revealed. 
5.2 The envelopes will be passed to the experimenter and the experimenter will 
return your envelope to you. 
5.3 You will have a moment to review your feedback sheet before the next 
round of the experiment begins. This task is repeated for five rounds. 
 
(6) Accumulated Points 
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6.1 After the 4th round is done, the experimenter will randomly select an integer 
between 1 to 4, denoted i. Your accumulated Liras for this task will be the 
Liras you received in the ith round. However, you will not be informed of 
your accumulated points until the end of the experiment. 





















I. The Receiver’s own estimate of the commodity 
value is __________ Liras. 
 
II. Choose only one option below (check the 
appropriate space) 
___ (a) Accept the Sender’s reported value and 
use it as my final estimate of the 
commodity value 
___(b) Reject the Sender’s reported value and use 
my own estimate of the commodity value 
as the final estimate. 
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Sender #________ (Enter your participant number) 
 
 
Feedback Sheet (Sender) 
 
 












1     
2     
3     
4     




Receiver #________ (Enter your participant number) 
 
 















1     
2     
3     
4     






You are designated the role of Predictor in this task, and your role is to predict the value 
of a commodity. 
 
This is an individual experiment and you are not paired with anyone. In a few minutes, 
you will participate in a five-round experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will 
be presented with a scenario from the first task of the experiment. All scenarios are 
obtained from previous sessions of the same experiment. 
 
The Actual Commodity Value 
• Similar to the first task, the actual commodity value is the sum of two numbers 
randomly generated from a specified range of integers. We will call these two 
numbers Integer I and Integer II. Each number will be generated from integers 
ranging from 0 to 50. The midpoint of the range is 25. All the integers within that 
range (i.e. 0, 1, 2, …, 48, 49, 50) are equally likely to be chosen.  
• The actual commodity value (the sum of Integer I and Integer II) can take any integer 
value from 0 to 100 Liras. 
• The actual commodity value will be determined at the beginning of each round. So 
the actual commodity value changes in each round. 
 
Sender and Receiver 
As you have seen in the first task of the experiment, the Receiver’s task was to estimate 
the commodity value while the Sender’s task was to report the commodity value to the 
Receiver. The Sender was informed of Integer I and Integer II and, thus, knew the actual 
commodity value. The Receiver was informed of Integer I and received a report from the 
Sender. The Receiver might either accept the Sender’s reported value and use it as the 
final estimate or reject the Sender’s reported value and use his own estimate as the final 
estimate. Their payoffs were as described in the instructions of task one. 
 
Your Task 
(1) Form & Information Distribution 
1.1 You will receive an answer sheet (as shown on page 130). 
1.2 You will be presented with information from an interaction between a 
Receiver and a Sender. You will be informed of Integer I, the Sender’s 
reported value, and the Receiver’s own estimate.  
 (2) Predictor’s Actions 
2.1 You will have 1 minute to answer two questions. 
2.2. First, predict which value, the Sender’s reported value or the Receiver’s 
own estimate, is closer to the commodity value. Put S if you think that the 
Sender’s reported value is closer to the actual commodity value and R 
otherwise. This is your first prediction. 
   2.3 Second, predict the commodity value from the given information. This is 
your second prediction. You can put any integer from 0 to 100. 
2.4 When you finish, please put raise your hand. The experimenter will collect 
the answer sheet from you. 
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2.5 Your earn money (in Lira) based on both predictions (explained below). 
 
(3) Feedback 
3.1 No feedback is given to you. 
3.2 This task is repeated for five rounds. 
 
(4) Accumulated Points 
4.1 After the 5th round is done, the experimenter will randomly select an 
integer between 1 to 5, denoted  i. Your accumulated Liras for this task 
will be the Liras you received in the ith round. 
4.2 Please wait patiently until the experimenter asks you to complete a post-
experiment survey. 
 
(5) Cash Award 
5.1 While you are completing the post-experiment questionnaire, the assistant 
will calculate your total monetary payoff, and pay you in cash (rounded to 
the nearest whole dollar). 
5.2 Your total monetary payoff includes your on-time arrival fee and the 
conversion of your Liras from the two experiment tasks. 
. 
Payoff (Liras) 
• The accumulated Liras are based on (1) whether your first prediction is correct and 
(2) your absolute estimation error (AE), computed as follows. 
 
 AE = |Second Prediction – Actual Commodity Value| 








You are informed that Integer I is 30, the Sender’s reported value is 62 Liras, and the 
Receiver’s own estimate is 51 Liras. You predict that (1) the Sender’s reported value is 
closer to the actual commodity value, and (2) the actual commodity value is 58 Liras. If 
the actual value of the commodity is 60 Liras, your answer to the first question is correct 
and your absolute estimation error (AE) is |58 – 60| = 2 Liras. Therefore, total money you 
receive from this round is 70 – 2 = 68 Liras. 
Your First Prediction 
is Correct 
70 - AE 











Integer I = 30 
Integer II = ? 
Commodity Value = 30 + ? 
Sender’s Reported Value = 62 






















CALCULATIONS FOR GAME-THEORETIC EQUILIBRIUMS OF THE 
AUDITOR-MANAGER TASK 
 
Because the task is a dynamic game of complete but imperfect information, I 
solve for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in a 
game of imperfect information. The detailed steps of the equilibrium calculations are as 
follows: 
First, I use backward induction, starting with Player 2 (the auditor), to find 
subgame perfect equilibriums. Let β = the probability that the manager’s reported value 
contains an error between -15 and 10. For the auditor, the expected payoff from accepting 
the manager’s report is [β × 50 + (1 - β) × 10] = 10 + (β × 40). When the auditor rejects 
the manager’s report, he/she receives a payoff of 40 if his/her estimate contains an error 
between -15 and 10, or nothing otherwise. As shown in Table 1, the auditor’s best guess 
for the commodity value, irrespective of the manager’s reported value, is between 20 and 
35, yielding a success rate of 51%. Hence, the expected payoff from rejecting the 
manager report is [51% × 40 + (1 - 51%) × 0] = 22.  
The auditor is indifferent from accepting or rejecting the manager’s report if 10 + 
(β × 40) = 22 or β = 26%. Let α = the probability that the auditor accepts the manager’s 
report. The auditor’s best responses can be summarized as: 
1. If β = 26%, the auditor is indifferent between accepting or rejecting the 
manager’s report (α = 0.5). 
2. If β > 26%, the auditor chooses to accept the manager’s report (α = 1). 
3. If β < 26%, the auditor chooses to reject the manager’s report (α = 0). 
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Next, I consider the manager’s payoff. The expected payoff when the manager 
reports a value of R is [α × R + (1 - α) × θV], where θV = 60% of the commodity value. 
Given the auditor’s best responses, the manager’s expected payoff becomes: 
1. When α = 0.5 (β = 26%), the manager’s expected payoff = [50% × R + (1 - 
50%) × θV] = 0.5R + 0.5θV. 
2. When α = 1 (β > 26%), the manager’s expected payoff = [100% × R + (1 - 
100%) × θV] = R. 
3. When α = 0 (β < 26%), the manager’s expected payoff = [0% × R + (1 - 0%) 
× θV] = θV. 
The two conditions required for perfect Bayesian equilibrium include consistent 
belief and sequential rationality. In this setting, the two conditions are translated into: 
1. The auditor belief (p) about the manager’s action (whether the manager’s 
report contains a within-range error) in the equilibrium is consistent with the 
manager’s chosen strategy: p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) = β. 
2. Given this belief of the auditor, the manager chooses the optimal strategy that 
maximizes his/her payoff. 
Since the manager’s reported value may affect how the auditor forms the belief, 
p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10), the manager chooses the highest R that makes the auditor’s belief 
consistent with the manager’s strategy (β). Now, we can specify three subgame perfect 
Nash equilibriums: 
1. The manager chooses the strategy (β) to include a within-range error in the 
report exactly 26% of the time. To maximize his/her payoff, he/she picks the 
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highest R that makes p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) = β = 26%. Given such belief, the 
auditor is indifferent from accepting or rejecting the manager’s report. 
2. The manager chooses the strategy (β) to include a within-range error in the 
report greater than 26% of the time. To maximize his/her payoff, he/she picks 
the highest R that  makes p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) = β > 26%. Given such belief, 
the auditor chooses to accept the manager’s report. 
3. The manager chooses the strategy (β) to include a within-range error in the 
report less than 26% of the time. To maximize his/her payoff, he/she picks 
any R that makes p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) = β < 26% (because his payoff, θV, 
does not increase with R) . Given such belief, the auditor chooses to reject the 
manager’s report. 
From the above three subgame Nash perfect equilibriums, the third one is the least 
likely to be the perfect Bayesian Equilibrium when θ = 60%. From the sequential 
rationality condition, the manager must prefer receiving a payoff of θV than R. Let us 
consider the extreme case (θV is maximum) when V = 50 + 50 = 100, so θV = 60. In this 
case, θV is preferred by the manager only if R ≥ 60 causes the auditor to form the belief 
p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) of less than 26%. Nevertheless, if the auditor’s belief is strictly based 
on the uniform distribution (see Table 1), any reported value up to 97 would lead the 
auditor to form a belief p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) of greater than 26%. 
Thus, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium should be between the first and second 
subgame perfect Nash equilibriums. That is, the auditor believes that there is a 
probability no less than 26% that the manager’s report contains the within-range error 
and given such belief, the manager chooses a reported value containing the within-range 
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error with a probability of no less than 26%. As a result, the manager chooses the highest 
R that makes the auditor’s belief consistent with the manager’s strategy. If the auditor 
forms such belief purely by the probability associated with the uniform distribution (see 
Table 1), the manager should always report R = the publicly known integer + 47. The 
reported value induces the auditor’s belief p(-15 ≤ R – V ≤ 10) = 27%, so the auditor 
accepts the report, consistent with the second subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.42 
                                                 
42 In the main study (Chapter 6), θV changes to 80% and 20% of the commodity value for the aggressive 
and conservative manager groups, respectively. However, the change does not alter the game theoretic 




TEN-PAIRED LOTTERY-CHOICE DECISIONS 
 
Your decision sheet (in the following page) shows ten decisions listed on the left. Each 
decision is a paired choice between "Option J" and "Option K." You will make ten 
choices and record these in the final column, but only one of them will be used in the end 
to determine your earnings. Before you start making your ten choices, please let me 
explain how these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
There are two boxes in front of the room that will be used to determine payoffs; each box 
contains ten pieces of paper numbered from 1 to 10. At the end of today’s experiment, I 
will randomly draw a piece of paper from each box. The first box is to select one of the 
ten decisions to be used, and the second box is to determine what your payoff is for the 
option you chose, J or K, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make 
ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not 
know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal 
chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option J pays $4 if I draw number 1 from the 
second box, and it pays $3.20 if the draw is 2-10. Option K yields $7.70 if the draw is 1, 
and it pays $0.20 if the draw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you 
move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, 
for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the draw will not be needed since each option pays the 
highest payoff for sure, so your choice for Decision 10 is between $4 and $7.70. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose 
between Option J and Option K. You may choose J for some decision rows and K for 
other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order. After you 
finish, I will collect your decision sheet and keep it until the end of today’s experiment. 
When we finish all other tasks, I will draw a number from each of the two boxes. The 
first number determines which Decision is going to count and the second number 
determines your earnings for this part. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You will 
have to write a decision, J or K in each of these boxes. 
 
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not talk 





Decision Option J Option K Your 
Choice 
(J or K) 
1 1/10 of $4.00, 9/10 of $3.20 1/10 of $7.70, 9/10 of $0.20  
2 2/10 of $4.00, 8/10 of $3.20 2/10 of $7.70, 8/10 of $0.20  
3 3/10 of $4.00, 7/10 of $3.20 3/10 of $7.70, 7/10 of $0.20  
4 4/10 of $4.00, 6/10 of $3.20 4/10 of $7.70, 6/10 of $0.20  
5 5/10 of $4.00, 5/10 of $3.20 5/10 of $7.70, 5/10 of $0.20  
6 6/10 of $4.00, 4/10 of $3.20 6/10 of $7.70, 4/10 of $0.20  
7 7/10 of $4.00, 3/10 of $3.20 7/10 of $7.70, 3/10 of $0.20  
8 8/10 of $4.00, 2/10 of $3.20 8/10 of $7.70, 2/10 of $0.20  
9 9/10 of $4.00, 1/10 of $3.20 9/10 of $7.70, 1/10 of $0.20  




EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS (MAIN STUDY) 
 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment, you will have the opportunity to 
accumulate money in Lira, an experimental currency, by performing two simple tasks. At 
the end of the experiment, your Liras obtained from all tasks will be tallied and you will 
be paid $1 for every 8 Liras earned. You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the 
experiment. During the experiment, please do not talk, exclaim, or communicate with 
other participants. If you have any question, please raise your hand and the experimenter 
will assist you. 
 
During the experiment, you will be identified only by a participant number, which will be 
given to you later. All decisions you make in the experiment will be anonymous, and no 





You will take the role of Sender or Receiver. Your role will be announced after the 
instructions are completed. The task is repeated for four rounds and your role will be the 
same in each round. You will be paired with a person in the other role. You will be paired 
with a different person in each round. You will not be told who these people are either 
during or after the experiment. 
 
In this task, there is a commodity of which actual value is determined in Lira.  
 
The Actual Commodity Value 
• The actual commodity value is the sum of two numbers randomly generated from a 
specified range of integers. We will call these two numbers Integer I and Integer II. 
Each number will be generated from integers ranging from 0 to 50. The midpoint of 
the range is 25. All the integers within that range (i.e. 0, 1, 2, …, 48, 49, 50) are 
equally likely to be chosen.  
• The actual commodity value (the sum of Integer I and Integer II) can take any integer 
value from 0 to 100 Liras. 
• The actual commodity value will be determined at the beginning of each round. So 
the actual commodity value changes in each round. 
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The Role of Sender 
 
Sender will give advice to the Receiver regarding how to estimate the commodity value. 
The Sender will submit the reported value to the Receiver using a communication sheet 
(as shown on page 145). 
 
Game Rules 
• The Sender will be informed of Integer I. 
• Integer II remains unknown to the Sender. However, the Sender will be informed of 
the interval that contains Integer II. This interval includes 15 integers and each integer 
has an equal chance of being the true value of Integer II. 
• The Sender can report any value from 0 to 100. The Sender’s reported value will be 
passed to the Receiver. The Receiver may either accept or reject the Sender’s reported 
value. 
• At the end of each round, the Sender will be informed of the points accumulated in 
that round via a feedback sheet (as shown on page 146). 
 
Sender Type 
• The Sender will be either Type X or Type Y. The Sender’s type does not change 
throughout the experiment. 
• There is a 50% chance that the Sender will be Type X or Type Y. All Senders in this 
room will be the same type. 
• The Sender type will be announced to everyone in this room later. 
 
Payoff (Points) 
The Sender payoff depends on his/her type. Type X and Type Y Senders accumulate 
points according to the following payoff trees: 
 
 







1. If the Receiver accepts the Type X Sender’s reported value, the Type X Sender 
will receive money (in Lira) equal to the reported value, irrespective of the actual 
commodity value.  
 
Receiver’s Acceptance 
of the Reported Value 
The Reported Value 





2. If the Receiver does not accept the Type X Sender’s reported value, the Type X 
Sender will receive money (in Lira) equal to 80% of the actual commodity value. 
 
Example 
Suppose the actual commodity value is 60 and the Type A Sender’s reported value of the 
commodity is 68 Liras. 
 
1. If the Sender’s reported value is accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for the 
round is 68 Liras. 
 
2. If the Sender’s reported value is not accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for 
the round is 80% * 60 = 48 Liras. 
 
 







1. If the Receiver accepts the Type Y Sender’s reported value, the Type Y Sender 
will receive money (in Lira) equal to the reported value, irrespective of the actual 
commodity value.  
 
2. If the Receiver does not accept the Type Y Sender’s reported value, the Type Y 
Sender will receive money (in Lira) equal to 20% of the actual commodity value. 
 
Example 
Suppose the actual commodity value is 60 and the Type Y Sender’s reported value of the 
commodity is 68 Liras. 
 
1. If the Sender’s reported value is accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for the 
round is 68 Liras. 
 
2. If the Sender’s reported value is not accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s payoff for 
the round is 20% * 60 = 12 Liras. 
Receiver’s Acceptance 
of the Reported Value 
The Reported Value 





The Role of Receiver 
 
The role of Receiver is to estimate the commodity value in Lira. 
 
Game Rules 
• The Receiver will be informed of Integer I but Integer II remains unknown to the 
Receiver. Unlike the Sender, the Receiver will not be informed of the 15 integer-
interval that contains the true value of Integer II. 
• The Receiver will get a communication sheet from the Sender (as shown on page 
145), who is free to report any value from 0 to 100, regardless of the actual 
commodity value. The communication sheet will contain the Sender’s reported value. 
• After receiving the communication sheet, the Receiver makes two decisions: 
(1) The Receiver will record his/her own estimate of the commodity value. This 
estimate will be used to calculate bonus points, which are not revealed to the 
Receiver. The closer the estimate is to the actual commodity value, the more 
bonus points the Receiver will earn for the round. 
(2) The Receiver chooses whether to accept the Sender’s reported value or not. This 
decision will determine the Receiver’s final estimate of commodity value. If the 
Receiver accepts the Sender’s reported value, the reported value will be used as 
the Receiver’s final estimate. If the Receiver does not accept the Sender’s 
reported value, the Receiver’s own estimate will be used as the final estimate. 
• At the end of each round, the Receiver will be informed of the points accumulated in 
that round (excluding the bonus) via a feedback sheet (as shown on page 147). 
 
Payoff (Points) 
• Estimation Error (E) = Final Estimate – Actual Commodity Value 









• Bonus = (100 - | Receiver’s Estimate – Actual Commodity Value|)/10. 
Receiver’s Acceptance 
of the Sender’s 
Reported Value 
-15 ≤ E ≤ 10 
-15 ≤ E ≤ 10 
10 + Bonus 
40 + Bonus 











Suppose Integer I is 25 and the Sender’s reported value is 68 Liras. The Receiver records 
his or her own estimate of 50 Liras. Then the Receiver rejects the Sender’s reported value 
so the Receiver’s own estimate of 50 Liras becomes the final estimate. 
 
1. If the commodity’s actual value is 60 Liras, the Receiver’s estimate error (E) is 50 - 
60 = -10.  Because E falls within the range of [-15, 10], the Receiver’s payoff for the 
round is 40 Liras plus the bonus. 
 
2. The bonus is computed as (100 - |50-60|)/10 = 9 Liras.  
 




Assume the same set of facts from example 1, except that the commodity’s actual value is 
35 Liras. 
 
1. Now the Receiver’s estimate error (E) is 50 - 35 = 15.  Because E falls outside the 
range of  [-15, 10], the Receiver’s payoff for the round is 0 Lira plus the bonus. 
 
2. The bonus is computed as (100 - |50-35|)/10 = 8.5 Liras.  
 




Determination of Your Role 
 
Now, please take one of the cards that the experimenter is passing out. On the card, the 
letter (R or S) indicates which player (Receiver or Sender) you will be in this task, and 
the number is your participant number. Please keep the card only to yourself. Do not 
show it to anyone else. 
 
The type of Sender in this room is Type X (or Y). 
 
(For Control Group only: The experimenter randomly selected 20% of participants who 
will not have to actually play this game and you are one of them. However, you will have 





(1) Form Distribution 
1.1 Sender will be given a communication sheet, a feedback sheet and an 
envelope. 
1.2 Receiver will be given a feedback sheet and an envelope. 
 
(2) Information Distribution 
 2.1 The Sender will be informed of Integer I and the possible range of Integer II. 
 2.2 The Receiver will be informed of Integer I. 
 
(3) Sender’s Actions 
3.1 The Sender has 30 seconds to indicate reported value on the top section of 
the communication sheet. The reported value may be any integer from 0 to 
100. 
3.2 When you finish, please put your communication sheet and feedback sheet 
in the envelope and raise your hand. The experimenter will collect the 
envelope from you. 
 
(4) Receiver’s Actions 
4.1 The Receiver will be given a communication sheet. The top section of the 
communication sheet contains the Sender’s reported value for the round, and 
the bottom section is for the Receiver’s decisions. You will have 30 seconds 
to answer two questions. 
4.2 Think about your own estimate of the commodity value and fill in the 
bottom of the communication sheet. Your estimate may be any integer from 
0 to 100. 
4.3 Check (a) if you want to accept the Sender’s reported value and use it as the 
final estimate, or (b) if you reject the reported value and want to use your 
own estimate as the final estimate. 
4.4 When you finish, please put your communication sheet in the envelope and 
raise your hand. The experimenter will collect the envelope from you. 
 
(5) Feedback 
5.1 All envelopes will be given to an assistant, who has minimal knowledge of 
the experiment. The assistant will calculate your payoff for the round, 
complete your feedback sheet, and put your feedback sheet back in the 
envelope. However, the Receiver’s bonus points will not be revealed. 
5.2 The envelopes will be passed to the experimenter and the experimenter will 
return your envelope to you. 
5.3 You will have a moment to review your feedback sheet before the next 
round of the experiment begins. This task is repeated for four rounds. 
 
(6) Accumulated Liras 
6.1 After the 4th round is done, the experimenter will randomly select an integer 
between 1 to 4, denoted i. You will receive from this task the Liras you 
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received in the ith round. However, you will not be informed of your 
accumulated Liras until the end of the experiment. 





















I. The Receiver’s own estimate of the commodity 
value is __________ Liras. 
 
II. Choose only one option below (check the 
appropriate space) 
___ (a) Accept the Sender’s reported value and 
use it as my final estimate of the 
commodity value 
___(b) Reject the Sender’s reported value and use 
my own estimate of the commodity value 
as the final estimate. 
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Sender #________ (Enter your participant number) 
 
 
Feedback Sheet (Sender) 
 
 












1     
2     
3     




Receiver #________ (Enter your participant number) 
 
 















1     
2     
3     





 Task Two 
You are designated the role of Predictor in this task, and your role is to predict the value 
of a commodity. 
 
This is an individual experiment and you are not paired with anyone. In a few minutes, 
you will participate in a five-round experiment. At the beginning of each round, you will 
be presented with a scenario from the first task of the experiment when the Receiver 
rejects the Sender’s reported value. All scenarios are obtained from other sessions of 
the same experiment. 
 
The Actual Commodity Value 
• Similar to the first task, the actual commodity value is the sum of two numbers 
randomly generated from a specified range of integers. We will call these two 
numbers Integer I and Integer II. Each number will be generated from integers 
ranging from 0 to 50. The midpoint of the range is 25. All the integers within that 
range (i.e. 0, 1, 2, …, 48, 49, 50) are equally likely to be chosen.  
• The actual commodity value (the sum of Integer I and Integer II) can take any integer 
value from 0 to 100 Liras. 
• The actual commodity value will be determined at the beginning of each round. So 
the actual commodity value changes in each round. 
 
Sender and Receiver 
As you have seen in the first task of the experiment, the Receiver’s task was to estimate 
the commodity value while the Sender’s task was to report the commodity value to the 
Receiver. The Sender was informed of Integer I and the 15 integer-interval that contains 
Integer II. The Receiver was informed of Integer I and received a report from the Sender. 
The Receiver might either accept the Sender’s reported value and use it as the final 
estimate or reject the Sender’s reported value and use his/her own estimate as the final 
estimate. Their payoffs were as described in the instructions of task one. However, keep 
in mind that the Sender can be either Type X or Y. You will not be informed of the 
Sender’s type in this task. 
 
Your Task 
(1) Form & Information Distribution 
1.1 You will receive an answer sheet (as shown on page 151). 
1.2 You will be presented with information from an interaction between a 
Receiver and Sender. You will be informed of Integer I, the Sender’s 
reported value, and the Receiver’s own estimate. However, the Sender 
type will be unknown to you.  
 (2) Predictor’s Actions 
2.1 You will have 1 minute to answer two questions. 
2.2. First, predict the actual commodity from the given information. You can 
put any integer from 0 to 100. 
2.3 Second, indicate your agreement with the Receiver’s decision to reject the 
Sender’s value (from 0 to 100%). For example, if you are 80% in 
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agreement with the Receiver’s decision to reject the Sender’s value, then 
put 80%. 
2.4 When you finish, please raise your hand. The experimenter will collect the 
answer sheet from you. 
2.5 Your payoffs are based on both of your answers (explained below). 
 
(3) Feedback 
3.1 No feedback is given to you. 
3.2 This task is repeated for six rounds. 
 
(4) Accumulated Liras 
4.1 After the 6th round is done, the experimenter will randomly select an 
integer between 1 to 6, denoted  i. You will obtain from this task the Liras 
you received in the ith round. 
4.2 Please wait patiently until the experimenter asks you to complete a post-
experiment survey. 
 
(5) Cash Award 
5.1 While you are completing the post-experiment questionnaire, the assistant 
will calculate your total monetary payoff, and pay you in cash (rounded to 
the nearest whole dollar). 
5.2 Your total monetary payoff includes that of your lottery choices and the 
conversion of your obtained Liras from the two experiment tasks. 
. 
Payoff (Liras) 
• The points accumulated are based on (1) your absolute estimation error (AE) and (2) 
your agreement (n%) with the Receiver’s decision to reject the Sender’s reported 
value. 
• First, AE = |Your Prediction of Commodity Value – Actual Commodity Value|. 










Whether the Sender’s 
reported value 
contains an error 
(Reported Value – 
Actual Value) outside 
the [-15, 10] range 
(50 – AE) + (20 * n%) 







You are informed that Integer I is 30, the Sender’s reported value is 62 Liras, and the 
Receiver’s own estimate is 51 Liras. First, you predict that the actual commodity value is 
58 Liras. Second, you indicate that you are 40% in agreement with the Receiver’s 
decision to reject the Sender’s reported value. If the actual value of the commodity is 56 
Liras, the Sender’s reported value contains an error of 6 Liras (62 – 56), which is still 
within the [-15, 10]. In addition, your absolute estimation error (AE) is |58 – 56| = 2 Liras. 
Therefore, total payoffs you receive from this round are (50 – 2) + (20 * [1 – 40%]) = 48 









Integer I = 30 
Integer II = ? 
Commodity Value = 30 + ? 
Sender’s Reported Value = 62 






1. Your estimate of the commodity 
value is ________ Liras (put a whole 
number from 0 to 100). 
2. Your agreement with the Receiver’s 
decision to reject the Sender’s 
reported value is ________% (put a 







 Auditor-Manager Incentives Quiz 
 
Because your knowledge of Task One is important for Task Two, please take a few 
minutes to answer the following questions. The questions are about payoffs of the 
Receiver and Sender in Task One. 
  
Put T (True) or F (False) in front of each statement. You will earn 4 Liras for each correct 
answer.  
 
__ 1. If a Sender’s report was rejected, he would receive higher earnings if he was Type 
Y, relative to Type X. 
 
__ 2. As long as the Sender’s report is accepted by the Receiver, the Sender’s earnings 
increase with the reported value, regardless of the Sender’s type. 
 
__ 3. A Receiver should reject the Sender’s report if the Receiver suspects that the 




POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (PEQ) 
 
This questionnaire is designed to collect information to help the researchers understand 
decisions made throughout the experiment. Please be assured that you cannot be 
personally identified from your responses. 
 
1. Please enter your participant number: ________ 
 
2-a. What is your standing in your university? (e.g., undergraduate, graduate) ________ 
2-b. What is your year of study (e.g., 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th)? ________ 
2-c. What is your major area of study (e.g., accounting, ISyE)? ________ 
 
3. What is your gender? (please check one) male ____   female ____    
 
4. Describe in your own words briefly what you did and how you came up with answers 







5. What is the type of manager in your session during the first task of the Experiment? 
(e.g., X, Y) ____ 
 
6. In the first task of the experiment, were you concerned about the usefulness of your 
report to Receiver? That is, in helping Receiver estimate the commodity value? (please 
circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
7. In the first task of the experiment, did you consider the potential effect of your report 
on Receiver’s earnings? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 




8. In general, do you think the Receiver should rely on the Type X Sender’s reported 
value (including all participants taking this role)? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
9. In general, do you think the Receiver should rely on the Type Y Sender’s reported 
value (including all participants taking this role)? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
10. Describe in your own words briefly what you did and how you came up with answers 







11. In the second task of the experiment, how do you compare the Receiver’s own 
estimate of the commodity value to the actual commodity value? (please circle one) 
 
     Much    Accurate           Much 
Lower   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Higher 
 
12. In the second task of the experiment, how do you compare the Sender’s reported 
value to the actual commodity value? (please circle one) 
 
        Much    Accurate           Much 
Lower   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Higher 
 
13. In general, do you think that experience as a Receiver helps increase performance in 
the second task? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
14. In general, do you think that experience as a Type X Sender helps increase 
performance in the second task? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 




15. In general, do you think that experience as a Type Y Sender helps increase 
performance in the second task? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
16. In general, how do you rate the trustworthiness of Type X Sender? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
17. In general, how do you rate the trustworthiness of Type Y Sender? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
18. In general, how do you rate the trustworthiness of Receiver? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
19. In general, how do you rate the competence of Type X Sender in estimating the 
commodity value? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
20. In general, how do you rate the competence of Type Y Sender in estimating the 
commodity value? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
21. In general, how do you rate the competence of Receiver in estimating the commodity 
value? (please circle one) 
 
      Very                Very 
      Low   1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11     High 
 
22. In the second task of the experiment, how much do you consider Receiver’s 
perspective before making decisions? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 




23. In the second task of the experiment, how much do you consider Type X Sender’s 
perspective before making decisions? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
At all    1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11   Much 
 
24. In the second task of the experiment, how much do you consider Type Y Sender’s 
perspective before making decisions? (please circle one) 
 
      Not               Very 
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